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Abstract
Ahmad Kindawi
A NEW SYNTHSIS: SAUDI SALAFISM AND THE CONTESTED IDEOLOGIES OF
MUḤAMMAD SURŪR
2019-2020
Corinne L. Blake, Ph.D.
Master of Arts in History
The thesis examines the life and thought of Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn,
the Syrian ideologue and founder of an influential Islamist trend within the Ṣaḥwa
(Awakening) movement in Saudi Arabia. In the highly politicalized Saudi Islamist scene
of the early 1970s, Surūr came up with a unique synthesis: an amalgam of the political
awareness of the Muslim Brotherhood in seeking political reform and the implementation
of an Islamic order and the religious thought of Wahhābīs. Under the influence of Surūr’s
ideas, a new group appeared, al-Surūriyya, which had a significant impact on Saudi
Islamic activism, becoming the main group within it. Surūr positioned himself and his
followers as centrist Salafis. While rejecting the violent approach of the “ḥizb al-Ghulāt”
(radicals), Surūr condemned “ḥizb al-Wulāt” (loyalists), who called for total obedience to
the rulers; he also wrote influential anti-Shiʿi treatises. Analyzing the debates between
Surūr, who advocated non-violent political activism, and “ḥizb al-Wulāt,” who adopted a
quietist posture, sheds light on the ongoing discussion about political engagement among
Salafis. This thesis is mainly drawn from primary sources: Surūr’s own corpus of
political and religious writings, journalistic work, and memoirs and a series of seven
recorded television interviews with Surūr as well as writings of other Salafis, especially
his opponents.
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Surūr’s Anti-Jamī Campaign: Condemning the Wrong and Rejecting Total
Obedience ..................................................................................................................82
Towards a New Reformism: Fiqh Al-Waqiʿ and Ongoing Polemics ........................86
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Chapter 1
The Surūrī Synthesis: Between Quietism and Political Engagement
Muḥammad Surūr bin Nāyef Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, hereafter Muḥammad Surūr,
founded the Islamist trend that later came to be known al-Surūriyya (Surūrism). Surūr’s
influential ideology, which is also known as al-Salafiyya al-Ḥarakiyya (dynamic or
activist Salafism), dominated the intellectual and religious spectrum of Saudi Arabia
between the 1980s and 1990s and is still popular in the Muslim world. The popularity of
Muḥammad Surūr’s ideas is rooted in his particularly creative approach to combing
elements of two of the most influential forces in 20th century Islamic life: the Salafī
creed—theological views stressing a return the al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (the pious ancestors) and
a rejection of the schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence (madhāhib)—and the political
views of the Muslim Brotherhood. Often referred to as a ḥarakī (politically activist)
trend, the Surūrīs—upholders of this ideology—diverged from many of their fellow
Saudi Wahhābīs by expressing an interest in public affairs and engaged in political and
social matters that had previously been solely the prerogative of the royal family. More
interestingly, they began to express oppositional opinions about the political actions of
the Saudi government just as the traditional Wahhābī religious establishment
unquestionably sanctioned all of the regime’s policies. Thus, as we shall see, Surūr
infused the political activism of the Muslim Brotherhood into Wahhābī traditions, staking
out a popular, yet perilous, Salafi synthesis that placed his movement at odds with
quietists and the Saudi state alike.

1

In the early twentieth century, as part of his effort to re-establish the Saudi
Kingdom, King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Saʿūd reinstated the Wahhābī religious establishment,
which had played a significant role in the formation of the first and second Saudi
kingdoms. However, he realized that in order to survive in the international arena, he
needed to restrain the zealotry of the Ikhwān (brothers), the tribal fighting force that he
used to conquer various regions, as these fighters were very critical of the King’s
pragmatic relationship with Western countries. Thus, in the late 1920s, he crushed his
erstwhile military protectors when they challenged his authority and created a division of
powers formula which stipulated that the Āl Saʿūd (House of Saʿūd) would rule and
determine the country’s foreign and economic policy independent of Islamic
jurisprudence, leaving the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ to control the vast religious, cultural, and
social spheres. In return, Wahhābī religious leaders would provide religious legitimacy
for Āl Saʿūd’s rule through an interpretation of the Qurʾān and other Islamic texts, which
justified the authority of Āl Saʿūd and made obeying the rulers part of the mandate to
obey God. 1 Since then, political quietism has dominated the Wahhābī religious leaders’
behavior and discourse; the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ limited their political involvement to only
providing naṣīḥa (advice) to the rulers, usually behind the scene.2
In the 1950s, increasing oil production in the Kingdom and the influx of
enormous profits, especially after the oil crisis in 1973, begin to undermine this quietest
consensus. Between the 1950s and 1970s, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who fled
1

David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 71-72; Madawi
Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 10-11.
2
Roel Meijer, “Introduction,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s new religious movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 17.

2

from the repression of Arab and Baʿthist socialist regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq often
played a leading role in the rapid development of the Kingdom’s institutions.3 Members
of the Muslim Brotherhood held high-level positions in the education system in Saudi
Arabia and taught in high schools and universities, out of which emerged al-Ṣaḥwa alIslāmiyya (the Islamic Awakening), an Islamic movement that developed in Saudi Arabia
between the 1960s and 1990s.4 One of the Muslim Brotherhood members who influenced
the Ṣaḥwa was the Syrian Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr, who taught in Saudi Arabia
between the 1960s and 1970s; in the early 1970s, he founded the dominant jamaʿa
(group) generally referred to as “al-Surūriyya.”
While followers of Muḥammad Surūr might share with some of these other Salafi
groups a willingness to engage in political opposition, they nonetheless diverged from
Salafi jihādī counterparts on matters of violence and positioned themselves as centrists
among other Salafīs. On the one hand, Surūr rejected rebellion with the sword against the
rulers because it leads to fitna (internal strife). On the other, he refused the practice of
Salafī and Wahhābī loyalists of unconditional obedience to the rulers, asserting that
political activism is consistent with Salafī manhaj (methodology).5 While Surūr adopted
the political vision of the Muslim Brotherhood in seeking to effect political reform,
despite his previous connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, like other Salafīs, he
3

Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 171-177.
4
Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: Religious Dissent In Contemporary Saudi Arabia, trans. George
Holoch. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), 38; Al-Rasheed, Contesting, 67.
5
Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn. “Naḥwa Kiyān Jadīd (28) Al-Ḥiwār Bayna Ahl al-Sunah: AlSalafiyyia bayna al-Wulāt wa al-Ghulāt” [Toward new Entity (28) Dialogue between the People of Sunnah:
The Salafism between the Loyalist and the Extremists (the Extremists.)] Al-Sunnah 65, 1997) [1417].
Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, “Naḥwa Kiyān Jadīd (29) al-Ḥiwār Bayna Ahl al-Sunnah: AlSalafiyyia bayna al-Wulāt wa al-Ghulāt,” [Toward new Entity (29) Dialogue between the People of
Sunnah: the Salafism between the Loyalist and the Extremists.] Al-Sunnah 67 (1997).
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attacked the organization for focusing more on politics than on purification of faith. To
avoid criticism from the Wahhābīs and Salafīs in Saudi Arabia for being overtly political,
Muḥammad Surūr used the slogans of the Salafi and Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ in his teachings
and rhetoric. He emphasized the Wahhābī slogan “creed first,” for example, which
suggested the superiority of creed not only over politics, but also over other religious
subjects like jurisprudence.6 However, he also reformulated concepts borrowed from the
Muslim Brotherhood to be consistent with the Salafī creed and elaborated principles to
enable engagement in politics.
Surūrī thought thus provided the tools to go beyond the existing Salafi binaries of
revolution and political quietism found in the practices of both Salafi and Wahhābī
schools, laying the groundwork for opposition to the Saudi regime through the expression
of explicitly non-violent political activism. However, as shall be shown in chapter four,
this novel hybrid ideology elicited strident opposition from other Salafī schools, such as
the Jāmī movement (Salafi group who adopted a quietist posture).
Significance of the Thesis
Since 9/11, Salafī groups have commanded widespread academic and policystudies attention, but most of this research emphasis has focused on Salafī-jihadīs, who
adopted violent acts against the existing political regimes and called for establishment of
the Islamic Caliphate. Non-violent Salafī groups, by contrast, have attracted scant interest
from researchers. Despite its popularity and wide prevalence over three decades across
ʿAdullah Nāb, “Mushaḥnat bayna al-Jāmiyya wa al-Surūriyya fi al-Saʿūdiyya” (Hassles between Surūrīs
and Jāmīs in Saudi Arabia). Ilaf, May 20, 2005.
http://elaph.com/Web/Politics/2005/5/63497.htm?sectionarchive=Politics.
6
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Saudi Arabia, the Surūri group (jamāʿa) has received almost no attention from
researchers.
As detailed below, the few accounts that exist portray the ideology of Surūr and
his followers as a hybrid ideology of Wahhābīsm and the Muslim Brotherhood, without
providing any analysis of his thought based on his writings. Most of the Arabic accounts
hold this jamāʿa (group) responsible for the radicalization of the Saudi population and
breeding violence without providing evidence from Surūr or other Surūris’ writings or
practices. This thesis is an intellectual biography of Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr offering
insights into his life, his intellectual works, and political activism. The thesis draws
mainly upon primary sources such as Surūr’s books, articles, lectures, and interviews to
analyze the Surūrī ideology, political vision, and his position within the Salafiyya
movement and gain a more in-depth picture of his ideas, thoughts, and synthesis.
Although Salafīs belong to the same theological system, the Salafiyya movement is not
homogeneous, and boundaries between its groups are fluid. Through analyzing the views
and actions of different Salafī groups on politics and violence and analyzing intra-Salafī
debates, this study reveals doctrinal differences and political distinctions between the
groups and provides a new understanding of the Salafiyya movement’s diversity. In
addition to contributing to our understanding of Salafism, the thesis provides insight into
significant events and transitional periods in the history of Saudi Arabia and Islamist
movements.
The thesis comprises five chapters. After examining the historical background and
context, the first chapter discusses the historiography of this topic. Chapter 2 focuses on
the formation of Surūr’s ideas and the creation of his synthesis. The third chapter
5

explores Surūr’s very popular anti-Shia and anti-Iran views that were not only doctrinal
accusations but also ethnic and political attacks. The fourth chapter examines Salafī
engagement in politics, analyzing intra-Salafī debates between Surūr, who adopted nonviolent political activism, and the Jāmīs, or as Surūr called them “ḥizb al-wulāt (party of
loyalists),” who took a quietist posture. Finally, chapter five explores Surūr’s rejection of
rising extremist currents within Salafī circles in the second half of the twentieth century.
Historical Background: The Origins of Wahhābī Quietism and Salafī Challenge
Between 1902 and 1932, after defeating several rivals, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz was able to
unify most of Arabia under his leadership. After he recaptured Riyadh in 1902 from the
Rashīds, the Wahhābī followers of the Muslim reform movement, founded by
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in the 18th century in Najd, central Arabia, were keen
to restore a relationship with Āl Saʿūd.7 The Wahhābīs, who purported to be returning to
the “true” principles of Islam, declared ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz their imam, a religious title that
gave him legitimacy for political and military leadership.8 The restoration of the alliance
set the boundaries of the political-religious relationship between ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and the
Wahhābīs.
It is crucial to understand the political position of the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ during the
period of unification of the Kingdom because of the defining political role they have
continued play until the present day. According to the scholar Madawi Al-Rasheed, King
It is important to note the followers of Shaykh ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb have rejected this label. Historically,
they called themselves al-mūwaḥidūn (the people of monotheism) and they prefer to be called Salafis. In
current academic discourse, the followers of the teachings of Shaykh ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb are referred to as
Wahhabis, not as Salafīs.
8
Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 50.
7

6

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and the kings after him derived their legitimacy from their “recognition
and enforcement of the Sharīʿa, a divine law above him and independent of his will.”9 In
return, the Wahhābīs advocated in their sermons and teachings for the obedience of and
submission to King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz as walī al-amr, leader of the Muslim community. They
also played a significant role in the creation of the Ikhwān (the tribal fighting force). The
Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ launched an educational program targeting nomadic tribesmen whose
practices were seen as un-Islamic. They sought to teach these tribal groups what they
perceived as authentic Islamic tradition and recruit them as soldiers for the Saudi
expansion.10
After helping ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz -conquer Mecca and the Hejaz, however, the Ikhwān
became very critical of the monarch’s relationship with Western countries. They believed
that all-non-Wahhābīs, including Muslims who didn’t accept their version of “true
Islam,” were infidels. Additionally, after defeating ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s rivals in Arabia, the
Ikhwān began raiding the areas where their rulers had treaties with the British. King ʿAbd
al-ʿAzīz banned raiding in the border areas, and when the Ikhwān launched raids on
southern Iraq, Transjordan, and the Emirate of Kuwait against his wishes, the tension
between the Ikhwān and ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz escalated. Soon these tensions culminated in a
battle that ended with ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz crushing his erstwhile Ikhwān supporters at the
Battle of Sabilla in 1929.11

Al-Rasheed, A History, 51-52. More on the Wahhābī ideology: Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam:
From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).
10
Commins, The Wahhabi, 80; Al-Rasheed, A History, 59-60. On the Wahhābī relation with Saudi State:
Guido Steinberg, “The Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi State: 1745 to the Present”, in Paul Aarts and Gerd
Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance, London: Hurst & Co., 2005, pp. 11–34.
11
Commins, The Wahhabi, 76-78, 88; Kepel, The War, 161-163.
9
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In 1932, King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz declared the formation of the current Saudi Kingdom
with the support of the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ, who were given control over religious
institutions and social spheres. At the same time, the Saudi royal family continually had
to curtail the zeal of the ʿulamāʾ when they interfered with efforts to build modern
institutions, sign oil agreements with American companies, and protect the country’s
international borders. Furthermore, in the period after the unification of the Kingdom and
building of national institutions, the Āl Saʿūd royal family took control of political,
economic, foreign, and defense matters.12 In return, the Wahhābī doctrine became the
dominant discourse of political power, and the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ enforced the Islamic
appearance of the public domain, serving a critical role in ensuring that the new laws and
institutions were in agreement with the strict Wahhābī teachings. These Wahhābī clerics
enforced segregation of the sexes, for example, and ensured the predominance of
religious education by supervising curriculum and emphasizing theological instruction.13
Meanwhile, the religious establishment, which became an institution under the control of
the political royal authority, reciprocated by calling for obedience and submission to the
walī al-amr (the ruler) and issuing fatwas (religious rulings) justifying his actions.
Furthermore, they equated obedience to the ruler with obedience to God and the Prophet;
political opposition or expressing a critical opinion were identified as khuruj ala walī alamr (rebellion against the ruler).14
When King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz died in 1953, the Saudi monarchy consolidated its rule
over most of Arabia, and the Wahhābī creed became the dominant theological school
12

Commins, The Wahhabi, 80-103.
Ibid, 104-107.
14
Al-Rasheed, Contesting, 49-50.
13
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across the country. However, regional developments from across the Middle East, and the
ascendance of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab socialist regime in Egypt in 1952, posed an
acute challenge to this royal-Wahhābī pact. The growing prestige of Nasser and Arab
socialist nationalist ideologies in the Arab world posed a threat to the conservative
Kingdom and concerned the Saudi regime, who worried that these ideas would gain
popularity in Saudi society. However, the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ were too traditional and did
not have the qualifications to counter Arab social nationalist and secular influences. As a
result, Saudi Arabia sought to forge alliances with conservative monarchies and political
actors in the region and elsewhere to combat the supremacy of what it saw as a
progressive movement, led by Nasser. The Saudi rulers began to emphasize the
importance of politics in Islam against the secular nationalism of Nasser in Egypt and the
Baʿth party in Syria and Iraq. During this time, the Saudis found in the Muslim
Brotherhood a natural ally in this conflict.15
The Muslim Brotherhood was established by Ḥasan al-Bannā in Egypt in 1928.
The main goals of the movement initially consisted of fighting the British occupation and
establishing an Islamic order in Egypt.16 After the assassination of its founder in 1949,
the Muslim Brotherhood evolved in the 1950s under the leadership of Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī
into a pan-Islamic movement, and it spread to many countries around the Muslim world.
This departure from the primacy of Islam in countries that adopted nationalist-socialism
contributed to the emergence of a new belief within the Muslim Brotherhood
organization that the Egyptian regime was un-Islamic and beyond reform. The only way
15

Kepel, The War, 159, 171-172.
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton:
Princeton University, 2013), 22.
16
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to reform such an un-Islamic regime, in turn, was through armed struggle.17 The group
who promoted those ideas is often referred to as Quṭbis, a reference to the adherents of
Sayyid Quṭb, an Egyptian author, educator, and Islamic theorist who emerged as a
prominent leader within the Muslim Brotherhood. Ultimately, Egyptian authorities
imprisoned and executed Quṭb for plotting to assassinate the Egyptian President, Gamal
Abdel Nasser, in 1964.18
While in prison, Quṭb wrote his famous work, Maʿalim fi al-Tariq (Milestones).
In this book, he introduced the concepts of Jahiliyya and hakimiyya which he borrowed
from the Pakistani thinkers Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī and Abū Ḥasan al-Nadawi.19 The
concept of Jahiliyya, usually translated as “the Age of Ignorance” in English, refers to
pre-Islamic Arabia. According to Quṭb, jahiliyya is the rejection of “divine authority for
human authority.”20 He asserted that “the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyahha
(ignorance)”21 In the face of the jahili regimes, Islamic law derived from Islamic scripts
(al-hakimiyya Li-llah - the sovereignty / governance of God) is the response. This
response should not only assume the form of “preaching and persuasion,” but also
“physical power and jihad.”22

Barbara Zoller, “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s
Persecution, 1954 to 1971,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 3 (2007): 419.
18
More about Qutb, John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013); Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb : the Theory of Jahiliyyah
(London: Routledge, 2006); Sayed Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb,”
Middle Eastern Studies 38 (3): 147, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714004475.
19
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton:
Princeton University, 2013), 43.
20
William E. Shepard, “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya,” International Journal of Middle East Studies
35, no. 4 (11, 2003): 524,
http://ezproxy.rowan.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/195593321?accountid=1360.
21
Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, ed. A.B. al-Mehri (Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006),
26.
22
Ibid, 65.
17
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After Muslim Brotherhood members attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954, he
cracked down on the organization, spurring many members of the group to immigrate to
Saudi Arabia. Another wave of the Muslim Brotherhood exiles fled to Saudi Arabia from
Syria after the socialist Baʿth party came to power in Syria in 1963. Nonetheless, Islamist
tendencies gained more support in the Muslim world, especially after the Arab countries’
devastating loss in the 1967 War, which led to a growing frustration with the secular
regimes. Ultimately, the nationalist-socialist regimes across the region harshly repressed
members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and
other countries. Under these circumstances, the Saudi leadership promoted the “antisocialist credentials” of the exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood to counterbalance the Arab socialism of Egypt’s Nasser. This tactic, in turn, gave the Muslim
Brotherhood a foothold in Saudi Arabia.23
At first, the Saudi regime welcomed this influx of Muslim Brotherhood
dissidents, not just to signal its opposition to the advent of secular Arab socialism across
the region, but also as a source of knowledge and skills to help with the modernization of
the Kingdom. Between the 1950s and 1970s, Saudi Arabia experienced massive social,
economic, infrastructural transformations, and, the Kingdom witnessed a vast
modernization of the state apparatus including the creation of universal education, efforts
to foster economic development, and the advancement of communication technology.
The impetus for these transformations stemmed mostly from growing petroleum
revenues.24 However, Saudi Arabia did not have enough nationals or citizens with the
23
24

Kepel, The War, 159, 171-172; Commins, The Wahhabi, 151-154.
Commins, 104-108.
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skills and expertise needed to support this process of modernization. As a result, the
expatriate Muslim Brotherhood community, many of whom were educated professionals
in medicine, engineering, and the sciences, provided a pool of skilled workers, though
according to the prominent scholar Gilles Kepel, they played the role “on condition that
they refrain from any political or religious proselytizing.”25
Indeed, exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia played a
significant role in the reformation of the educational system and held high-level
positions, with Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members like Muḥammad
Surūr, Muḥammad al- Mubārak, and Muḥammad Quṭb teaching in Saudi universities,
colleges, and educational institutions. Others played important roles in creating academic
curricula through which they brought their views on modern societal, political, and
economic matters.26
Accordingly, in the late 1960s, Saudi Arabia witnessed the emergence of what is
often referred to as al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya, the Islamic Awakening or the Ṣaḥwa which
has been characterized as “a vast social movement practicing a modern form of Islamic
activism.”27 The Ṣaḥwa movement represents a hybrid ideology based on a mix of
Wahhābī ideas in religion and the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas in politics.28 The Saudi
Arabian government supported this ideology due to two incidents that suggested it could
serve as a source of support for maintaining Āl Saʿūd’s authority internally and
externally. The first incident was when a group of Wahhābī dissidents led by Juhaymān
25

Kepel, The War, 171-172.
Lacroix, Awakening, 42-46.
27
Lacroix, Awakening, 38.
28
Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2009), 53; Kepel, The
War, 156-57.
26
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al-ʿUtaybī occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, aiming to topple the rule of Āl
Saʿūd. After two weeks of a siege, Saudi Special Forces stormed the Mosque with the
help of Pakistan’s Special Services Group and French Special Forces on 9 January 1980.
Al-ʿUtaybī was executed by the Saudi authorities in 1980.29 In the same year, the success
of the Iranian Revolution that established a Shīʿite Islamic state in Iran jolted the Āl
Saʿūd rulers, who felt threatened by Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary discourse
fueling the desire for political change across the region. Consequently, the Ṣaḥwa gained
momentum and enjoyed relative freedom to increase its influence in the 1980s across a
variety of educational settings.30
The Ṣaḥwa movement was represented by two main groups or jamāʿat: the
Ikhwān (the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood) and al-Surūriyyun (Surūrīs) who were the
dominant Islamist political group in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Saudi Arabia.31 It is
often noted that followers of the Surūrī trend in the Kingdom represented a majority
among Saḥwis. Other Ṣaḥwis besides those aligned with these two movements followed a
variety of global political movements, including for example, al- Qaʿida and Hizb alTahrir.32
Two members of the exiled Muslim Brotherhood, Muḥammad Quṭb and
Muḥammad Surūr Zayn bin Nāyef al-ʿĀbidīn played a central role in infusing younger
Saudis with a mixture of Muslim Brotherhood political ideology and the more traditional
Wahhābī beliefs that had long dominated the Kingdom. Muḥammad Quṭb, Sayyid Quṭb’s
29
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brother, was known as shaykh al-Ṣaḥwa (the Shaykh of the Ṣaḥwa). After being released
from Egyptian jails during Anwar Sādāt’s presidency, he moved to Saudi Arabia and
taught at Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. He published and promoted his brother’s
books and ideas, while mentoring the scholarship of leading Islamic theologians and
thinkers, including people like Safar al-Ḥawālī, one of the prominent figures of the
Ṣaḥwa movement. Muḥammad Quṭb attempted to reconcile the doctrines of the Muslim
Brotherhood with Wahhābīsm that dominated in Saudi Arabia.33
The Syrian Sheikh Muḥammad Surūr Zayn bin Nāyef al-ʿĀbidīn—the primary
subject of this thesis—also played a central role in introducing a political orientation to
Wahhābī Salafīst traditional circles in Saudi Arabia. Born in a village called Tasil in
Darʿa province in southern Syria in 1938, Surūr’s family traces its lineage to Zayn alʿĀbidīn ibn Al-Ḥusayn ibnʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib. He received his primary education in local
schools, then moved to study his middle and secondary levels in Darʿā where he studied
under reputable educators in Syria at that time, before finally moving in 1958 to the
capital Damascus to complete his secondary education at the National Scientific College.
After obtaining his degree, he joined Damascus University where he graduated from the
Faculty of Law. Surūr benefited and was greatly influenced by senior ʿulamāʾ in
Damascus such as Sheikh Alī Ṭanṭawī, Muḥammad al-Mubārak, and ʿIsām al-ʿAṭṭār. His
primary influence, however, was Sheikh Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī, who founded the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood and who taught him a Personal Status Law course at the
university.34
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In the1960s, Muḥammad Surūr became what the scholar Stephane Lacroix
referred to as a “second-rank figure” in the movement at precisely the same time when
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood suffered from divisive splits between two factions.35
Initially, Muḥammad Surūr was close to the Damascus wing of the Muslim Brotherhood
under the secretary general ʿIsām al-ʿAṭṭār. However, he later moved more towards a
more hardline faction of the Muslim Brotherhood led by Marwān Hadid, a student of
Sayyid Quṭb who advocated armed struggle against the Syrian regime.36Muḥammad
Surūr soon started to criticize the more moderate Damascus leadership of the group for
tolerating “Ṣūfis” within its ranks, which was one of the reasons he was forced to leave
Syria in 1965.37
In his first broadcasting interview, Surūr said that he had to leave Syria because
political activism became difficult under the repression of the Baʿth party, which seized
power in March 1963. Surūr migrated to Saudi Arabia and worked as a teacher in the
Scientific Institutes in Buraydah, Ḥāʾil and the Eastern Province. In Saudi Arabia, Surūr
enjoyed the opportunity to meet Muslim Brotherhood members from other countries and
continued to deepen his commitment to political activism. At the time, exiled Muslim
Brotherhood and leaders from the Arab and Muslim world either moved to the Kingdom
1%D8%A9/; Television interview with Muḥammad Surūr was broadcast by Al-Hiwar channel in March
2008 as part of the program called Murājaʿāt [Revisions]. The series consists of seven recorded interviews.
35
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or made frequent visits. Sheikh Surūr, who was a teacher at the Scientific Institutes,
found fertile ground for his ideological views and activities.
The religious environment of his new home in Saudi Arabia soon inspired
Muḥammad Surūr to adopt the creed of Salafism, even though he never relinquished his
commitment to political action. His method and “new convictions,” however, brought
about long-term conflicts with Muslim Brotherhood.38 By 1969, Muḥammad Surūr broke
away from the organization after challenging the leadership’s orders to Muslim
Brotherhood exiles to refrain from participating in Saudi political activism. During the
early 1970s, Muḥammad Surūr continued his political engagement and eventually
emerged as a leading focal point of a ḥaraki (politicized activist) group among the Saudi
youth.39
Surūr sought to adopt and spread a new form of Islamic activism that was closer
to the Wahhābī ideological vision, emphasizing the priority of the creed over other
matters. Despite the instrumental role he played in establishing a new group in the
Kingdom, Surūr continued to assert that he was not a leader of the movement because he
is not “an ʿalim in the sharīʿa sciences,” pointing out that he does not want to “burden the
reformist renewal project with the responsibility for [his] previous mistakes.”40 As a
result, Falāḥ al-ʿIṭrī, a Saudi secondary school teacher in the capital Riyadh, took on the
Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, “Al-Waḥda Al-Islāmyyia 8: Surūryyia” [Islamic Unity 8:
Sururism]al-Sunna 27, (1992) [1413 Hijri], 47.
39
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40
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leadership role of the group.41 Saʿd al-Faqīh, a Saudi dissident in London, confirmed that
Surūr was not the leader of this jamāʿa but that he contributed to it by way of his
previous activist experience.42
At the early stages of its formation in the early 1970s, the group was called
jamāʿat Falāḥ, referring to the name of the cofounder Falāḥ al-ʿIṭrī. Surūr and most
members of this group refused to give a name to their jamāʿa; to distinguish themselves
from the Ikhwān (the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood), they used “zumala’a alakharun”
(colleagues from the other side).43 The group initially did not use the term Surūrīsm; it
was used for the first time during the Gulf War in the early 1990s, not by the followers of
the Surūrī trend, but by their opponents. Ibrāhīm al-Sikrān, who was active in the jamāʿa,
states that the term “came from opponents of the Surūri approach and those who were
affected by it, especially the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood who saw in this trend Islamic
activism’s energy wasted.”44 Surūr himself confirmed that this name came after his
disagreement with the Muslim Brotherhood.45 However, the Jāmīs, followers of the Salafī
Sheikh Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī, who emerged during the Gulf War and advocated
total obedience to the rulers in their conflict with the opposition, were responsible for
Mishari al-Dhayidi, “Muḥammad Surūr ghādara Sūrīyah Baʿd Nakbah alIkhwān... Istaqra wa ʿallma fi
Buraydah... Khalṭa Ḥarakiyya alIkhwān bi Thawriyya Quṭb bi Salafiyya Ibn Taymīyah,” [Muḥammad
Surūr Left Syria after Brotherhood’s Catastrophe, Settled, Taught in Baridah, Mixed Brotherhood
Movement with Qutḅ’s Revolutionariness, Ibn-Taymiyah’s Salafism] Al-Sharq Al-Awast. October 28,
2004, P. 4.
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Ibid.; Islam Muḥammad, “Maḥāṭāt Al-surūriyya (1): Kāifa Shakal al-Ikhwān Bidayyat al-tayyar alSaʿūdi,” [Stages of Suruism (1): How did the Ikhwān form the beginning of the Saudi Trend,] Ida2at,
November 27, 2016, https://www.ida2at.com/alsrorih-plants-1-how-muslim-brotherhood-forms-thebegining-of-the-saudi-group/
44
al-Dhayidi. “Muḥammad Surūr,” 4.
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disseminating this epithet during their relentless dispute with the Surūrīs during the Gulf
War.46 Probably, naming the group after a person who was not a Saudi was an attempt to
link the jamāʿa with external actors in order to delegitimize its practice and discourse.
Surūr’s adherence to Salafi ideology and his political activism in the Kingdom put
him in conflict with his erstwhile Muslim Brotherhood expatriates, ultimately leading to a
rupture with previous mentors and colleagues. In 1973, the Muslim Brotherhood
representative in Saudi Arabia informed the Saudi authorities about Surūr’s political
activism in the Kingdom, which ended his contract and expelled him.47 At that point,
Surūr went to Kuwait where he worked as a contributing essayist to Al-Mujtamaʿ, a
magazine. The magazine was published in Kuwait and was established in 1969 by the
Association of Social Reform (Jamʿiyyat al-islaḥ al-ijtimaʿi), the Kuwaiti branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood. In 1976, Surūr became its editor and he established the Dar alArqam Publishing house. Around this time, Surūr began to study Shīʿism and published
his well-known book, Then Came the Turn of Majūs (Zoroastrians), which criticized the
Iranian Revolution and warned against the threat of Shīʿite domination of the Middle
East. 48 In Kuwait, he gradually began to lose his connection with the jamāʿa in Saudi
Arabia that he had originally inspired and instead “tried to establish a new movement,
based in the Salimiyya neighborhood of Kuwait City, but the plan failed.”49 In 1984,
Surūr moved to the United Kingdom where he established a center of Sunnah Studies and
al-Dhayidi, “Muḥammad Surūr,”4.
More about Surūr’s expulsion from Saudi Arabia in chapter two.
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published Sunnah magazine and several books. In 2004, he moved to Jordan before
moving finally to Qatar, where he died in 2016.50
Towards a Typology of Salafī and Wahhābī Diversity
By the mid-20th century, Saudi Arabia witnessed the increasing influence of
“modern Salafism,” a school of thought that focuses on purifying Islam from putative
“bid’” (plural of bid’a “innovations”) and returning to the model of the Prophet and the
al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (the righteous ancestors).51 Salafīs reject taqlīd (“blind” following/
imitation) of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (madhahib) because they believe
that the later generation of the Islamic scholars introduced unlawful innovations. Instead,
the Salafīs promoted ijtihād (independent judgement) in legal matters, relying on proof
(dalīl) from revelation (the Qurʾān) and early tradition (Sunna) to form Islamic opinions
or legal judgments.52
It is essential to show the main differences between the Wahhābīs and Salafīs
because people often use the two terms interchangeably. Undoubtedly, they share a lot in
common. Both emphasize the same theological orientation of purifying Islam from
unlawful innovations and emphasizing the oneness of God. While the Salafīs condemn
taqlīd and promote ijtihad, however, the Wahhābīs tend to accept the wisdom of past
Islamic legal precedents and adopt the Hanbalī school of jurisprudence. In the 1960s, for
Muḥammad Surūr’s Bio on his website.
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example, Shaykh Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914-1999), a Syrian scholar of
Albanian origin, taught at the University of Medina, but he had to leave after he criticized
views against Wahhabism for upholding Hanbali madhab and thus engaging in taqlīd. 53
His followers, who constitute the mainstream of Salafis, reject any form of engagement
in political life and eschew participation in political parties. They view the political
parties and movements as innovative, corruptive, and divisive of the belief of umma.
Indeed, Shaykh al-Albānī and his followers condemn Islamist movements like the
Muslim Brotherhood as sources of division and political deviations, accusing it of paying
attention to politics over ʿilm (religious knowledge).54
In the wake of the first Gulf War (1990), a new Salafi offshoot emerged in the
form of a current known as the “Jamīs,” whose followers increasingly emphasized
unyielding support for the Saudi royal family. Drawing their ideological and doctrinal
thoughts from the teachings of Shaykh al-Albānī, the Jamīs or Madkhalīs (in reference to
Shaykh Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī and Shaykh Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, two leading
figures) arose as a response to the Ṣaḥwa, a politicized Salafī movement that had opposed
the Saudi government’s decision to host American troops during the Gulf War. This
emerging Salafi group are referred to as loyalist Salafīs, and at least in political matters,
are aligned more with the Wahhābīs than other Salafīs. The Jāmīs share with other Salafīs
a theological emphasis on eliminating what they regard as illegitimate religious
53
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“innovations,” rejecting taqlīd, and promoting ijtihad, but they disagreed with others on
matters of political quietism.55
At the same time, other fissures opened up between mainstream Salafīs and
dissident jihādī Salafī groups who advocated violence against what they saw as corrupt
political regimes in the Muslim world and called for the re-establishment of the Islamic
caliphate. Unlike mainstream Salafis, takfir (excommunication) and shirk (associating
partners with Allāh) constitute the core principles of the creed of jihadī -Salafi groups
such as al-Qaʿida. Like other Islamist movements, jihādī-Salafist groups have been
profoundly inspired by the ideas of Sayyid Quṭb, especially the principles of jahiliyya
(age of ignorance; the pre-Islamic society) and ḥakimiyya (sovereignty/governance of
God). Academic researchers trace the emergence of the jihadī trend within Salafism to
the 1980s war in Afghanistan when thousands of Muslims engaged in the Afghan war
against the Soviet Union.56
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, where most of the attackers were
from Saudi Arabia, Saudi officials have sought to eliminate perceptions that the attacks
are connected with their adherence to Wahhābīsm by defecting blame to the imported
ideologies of political Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. More
recently, in his ambitious effort to improve the country’s image, the powerful Crown
Prince, Muhammad bin Salman, said in an interview with Time magazine that Surūris,
who took their inspiration from Muhammad Surūr, are “ahead a little bit within the
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Muslim Brotherhood, viewing things more extremely in the Middle East.” Despite their
emphasis on non-violent political engagement, the Crown Prince added, “but in our law
they are criminals and whenever we have enough evidence against any one of them, they
will face a court.”57 With this statement, Ibn Salman is trying to re-direct blame for
terrorism, violence, and extremism away from Wahhābīsm—the usual culprit identified
in international discourses—and toward Surūri ideology instead.
Historiography
In the aftermath of the 1900 Gulf War, a body of literature emerged to discuss
Islamist criticism of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for inviting foreign forces on its soil.
Islamist dissent has been examined by several works that explore its origins, offer
detailed biographies of prominent Saudi figures, record their discourses, and note their
political activities in opposition to the Saudi government, as we shall discuss below.
However, the scholarship about the ideology of the Ṣaḥwa movement and the figures who
influenced it is sparse. Muḥammad Surūr’s influence on the Ṣaḥwa and his role in
founding the Surūri group which dominated the social and political scene in Saudi Arabia
for almost 20 years has received little attention from researchers.58
In Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, for example, Mamoun Fandy surveys
the ideas and political ideologies of the six most important Islamist Saudi dissident
Muhammad Ibn Salman, “Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Talks to TIME About the Middle East,
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leaders in the 1990s, who mostly participated in non-violent political opposition. He
provides a rich empirical base, documenting the vast literature produced by the prominent
figures (lectures and writings) and their use of the latest technologies: videos, cassettes,
and the Internet. Fandy discusses two key figures in the Ṣaḥwa movement usually
described as Surūris, Salmān al-ʿAwda and Safar al-Ḥawālī, who expressed their
opposition to the Saudi regime’s alliance with the West in many sermons during the Gulf
War.59 His account also includes the dissidents in exile, Saʿd al al-Faqīh and Muḥammad
al-Masʿari, who added a “cyberspace” aspect to classic exile politics in London, and the
Shīʿite leader Sheikh Ḥasan al-Saffar.60 He also discusses the role of Osama bin Laden,
who adopted a more violent approach in sponsoring terrorist acts against Americans in
Saudi Arabia, Uganda, and Tanzania.61 In his book, Fandy adopts a biographical
approach that focuses on analyzing their ideas of each Islamist figure rather than
indicating the historical factors or influences that led to the rise of those Islamist ideas
and leaders in the first place.
Other scholars have explained the rise of Islamist political opposition against the
Saudi monarchy in the 1990s in terms of an amalgam of domestic and foreign factors. On
the domestic level, one factor that most scholars emphasize is the slide of oil prices,
which affected living standards and led to cuts in all welfare programs for Saudi Arabian
citizens, providing an opening to Islamist opponents of the state. Another factor included
the social incongruities of the Kingdom and, according to the political scientist Hrair
Dekmejian, “the impact of modernization and the spread of Western cultural
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influences.”62 The final reasons on the domestic level were the growth in the graduates
from Islamic universities who became the backbone of the religious resurgence and the
role of charismatic religious figures like Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān al-ʿAwda, key
figures in the Sahwa movement.63 On the international front, in the 1980s, the Saudi
kingdom became vulnerable to the threat of Iran’s ambitions to become the leader of the
Islamic world, Saddam Hussein’s expansionist ventures, and the presence of the U.S
troops in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region, thereby contributing to the eruption
of political dissent.64
Most Arabic sources funded by the Saudi government or members of royal family
portray the Surūrī jamāʿa and other Sahwi jamāʿat as tools of foreign religious influence,
describing them as inflexible groups that used Islam to achieve their political and
ideological aspirations or an Islamist seizure of power in the Kingdom.65 They accuse
Surūr of laying the groundwork for violent jihādī groups like al-Qaʿida, arguing that he
was one of the people who introduced the concept of ḥakimiyya, which leads to takfīr
(excommunication) of all the regimes in the Arab world.66
Recently, several scholars have begun to study the origins of Islamic opposition to
the Saudi Kingdom going back to the early days in the 1950s and 1960s, looking for the
roots of Islamic activism and identifying sources of the Ṣaḥwa movement’s political
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orientation. In his book, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, Gilles Kepel
reflects on Saudi official discourse, arguing that jihādi groups emerged from the Ṣaḥwa
movement, which in turn was influenced by the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood
expatriates in Saudi Arabia. He writes that “the phenomenon of Osama bin Laden and his
associates cannot be understood outside this hybrid tradition. It is the offspring—
monstrous, natural, legitimate, depending on one’s point of view—of the marriage
between local Wahhabism and international Islamist activism, facilitated at the highest
echelons by the complicit meditation of the United States and Saudi Arabia.”67 While he
indicates that “the [Egyptian and Syrian] Muslim Brotherhood obeyed the prohibition on
proselytizing to Saudi subjects,” later, he seems to suggest the opposite, attributing the
emergence of the Islamist political tendency and terrorism to the influence of Muslim
Brotherhood members from Egypt and Syria.68 He argues that this would not have
happened without the freedom to operate granted by the Saudi government.69 To support
his argument, Kepel notes that Muḥammad Qutḅ supervised the dissertation of Safar alḤawālī, a prominent figure in the Ṣaḥwa movement, that focused on the ills of
secularism. Muḥammad Surūr also taught Salmān al-ʿAwda as a teenager at the Scientific
Institution in Buraydah.70 However, these two examples highlighted by Kepel alone do
not provide strong evidence for the radicalization of the Saudi Arabian population by the
Muslim Brotherhood; arguably, Wahhābī theology has played a much larger role with its
focus on jihād and takfīr.
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Meanwhile, in her landmark work, Contesting the Saudi State, Madawi alRasheed also emphasizes the influence of external ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood on
the Ṣaḥwīs. She argues that the Sahwis “rediscovered the revolutionary potential of
Wahhabi religio-political discourse and articulated it in a modern language accessible to
all.”71 In his book, Awakening Islam, Stéphane Lacroix provides a similar argument with
an important qualification, contending that “although the Sahwa was at first partly the
product of foreign influences, it thus acquired an endogenous character by producing its
own identity and its own organizations.”72 In his analysis, Lacroix discusses the influence
of the exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt and Syria, as well as the
former member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh Muḥammad, Surūr, on the
cohort of Saudi activists.
Stéphane Lacroix’s book is one of the few accounts that examine the rise of
Surūrism and its main figures. He discusses the jamāʿa in the context of what is called alṢaḥwa al-Islamiyya, the primary Islamist social trend that emerged in the 1960s as a
combination of the Wahhābī creed and imported political ideas from the Muslim
Brotherhood. He indicates that the Ṣaḥwa movement was represented by two main
jamāʿat: the Ikhwān (the Muslim Brotherhood) and al-Surūriyyun (Surūrīs) who was the
dominant Islamist.73 In the 1990s, the Ṣaḥwa trend was the only political group that
opposed the Saudi Arabian regime.
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The political thought of the Wahhābīs after the establishment of the Saudi
Arabian Kingdom has been studied by several researchers recently. There is an
agreement in this body of literature that political quietism permeated the discourse of the
Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ: the ʿulamāʾ endorsed interpretations that promoted consent and
obedience to the rulers. Peaceful or violent rebellion is forbidden, and the only political
activity that the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ may practice is providing advice to the ruler in
secrecy.74 The Wahhābī political discourse and behavior continued unchallenged until the
emergence of Ṣaḥwa movement in the 1970s. The rise of a new generation of ʿulamāʾ,
the shaykhs of the Ṣaḥwa, not only undermined the political authority of the Saudi
Arabian Kingdom, but also challenged the discourse of the traditional Wahhābī
ʿulamāʾ.75 Madawi al-Rasheed states that they “were uncomfortable with the religiopolitical aspect” of traditional Wahhābī tradition.76
By the 1980s, the Ṣahwī ʿulamāʾ in Saudi Arabia specifically began to criticize
the political discourse of the traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ for focusing on the ritual
aspects of religion and ignoring politics. The Surūris criticized the ʿulamāʾ for a lack of
understanding of reality (fiqh al-wāqiʿ). The critique was identified by Stéphane Lacroix,
who clarifies the meaning of the principle of fiqh al-wāqiʿ and how the Surūris used it to
attack the ʿulamāʾ. He explains the criticism as resulting from the competition between
the traditional Wahhābī circle and the Ṣaḥwī ʿulamāʾ: the young ʿulamāʾ did not have the
access to the high positions in the religious apparatus such as the Senior ʿulamāʾ Council
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and General Office for the Management of the Scientific Research, Fatwas, Preaching,
and Guidance.77
In the 1990s, fiqh al-wāqiʿ became one of the debatable points between the Surūr
and other Ṣaḥwīs on one side and the Jāmīs, a new group of Salafīs, on the other side.
Jāmīs launched a blistering critique against Surūrīs and Ṣaḥwīs for misusing the
principle. In turn, Surūr and others responded to their attacks, which led to a heated
debate between them. However, there is little follow up in existing literature about the
impact of such debates and their recriminations.

77

Lacroix, Awakening Islam, 144-147.

28

Chapter 2
Toward a New Synthesis in Saudi Arabia
Muḥammad Surūr’s thought went through many stages before reaching its
distinctive synthesis: blending the political awareness of the Muslim Brotherhood with
the religious thought of the Wahhabis and creating an influential Islamic trend in Saudi
Arabia and the Muslim world. This chapter examines the development of Surūr’s thought
and its ideological framework. His outlook on Islam was shaped primarily by teachers
who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, and early experiences in the ranks of the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood shaped his political awareness and commitment to
organization and planning. The rise of national secular parties and the political
polarization of the 1950s also comprised decisive factors in forming his ideological
convictions. Examining the early period of Surūr’s life is crucial to understanding his
subsequent career, as it shaped his Islamic path, political awareness and political and
organizational experience.
Furthermore, the chapter details the fine-grained distinctions between the Muslim
Brotherhood, which is the most popular trend in political Islam, and political Salafists.
Although both groups are categorized as Islamists, pursue the same goals, and have
considerable interactions, they nevertheless diverge in terms of theology and praxis. This
chapter, therefore, explains some of the most important theological and ideological
distinctions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. Particularly, Surūr
criticized the Muslim Brotherhood’s focus on politics at the expense of religious
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knowledge (ʿilm), thus spurning centralization and a hierarchic organizational structure
for his group.
To shed light on his early life and ideological shifts, we will examine Surūr’s
writings in his magazine al-Sunnah, where he penned a series of articles talking about his
experiences in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood ranks, his embrace of Salafi ideology, and
his activism in Saudi Arabia. “Murājaʿāt,” (Revisions), a series of seven recorded
interviews with Surūr on Al-Hiwar channel, also offers further details of various aspects
of his journey.
Surūr’s Ikhwani Background
As a youth, Surūr did not receive an intensive religious legal education.
According to his own recollections, few educated people and experts in ʿilm al-sharʿi
(religious legal knowledge) worked in his home region of the Ḥawrān area.78 Thus his
Islamic education came mainly from lay teachers, many of whom were members of the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Most of his teachers did not originate from the Ḥawrān area,
but from urban centers like Damascus or other nations like Palestine and Jordan. Shaykh
Muḥammad Luṭfī al- Ṣabbāgh, a linguist, faqīh (an Islamic jurist), educator and an
activist in the Muslim Brotherhood from Damascus, was one of Surūr’s teachers in
middle school and an important early influence. In middle school, Surūr accompanied his
teacher on trips to the towns and villages of Ḥawrān to deliver lectures and sermons.79
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Murājaʿāt; For Al-Sabbagh life) Ayyman Dhu Al-Ghina, “Fī Raḥīl al-ʿalāmah al-Shaykh Muḥammad b.
Luṭfī al- Ṣabbāgh,” alukah.net. https://www.alukah.net/culture/0/124370/.
78
79

30

In his youth, Surūr witnessed the growth of Arab and Syrian nationalist feelings
among the Arab population, especially in a rural area like Ḥawrān; political events and
disputes played a significant role in forming his ideological awareness. From
independence through the late 1960s, Syrian politics were marked by upheaval and
repeated military coups. Political disputes and ideological conflicts between different
players, including the Baʿth Party, Nasserites, Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian Social
Nationalist Party, dominated post-independence Syria. According to Surūr, student
demonstrations proved instrumental in bringing down the military rulers in the 1950s,
and these events often echoed across outlying areas of the country including Ḥawrān.
Surūr stated that school students actively participated in the country’s political life and
had a unique political consciousness. The conflicts of the time left a lasting imprint on
Surūr, as he recounted that the heated partisan conflicts among students belonging to the
Baʿth Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Social Syrian Nationalist Party sometimes
precipitated the suspension of study in schools in Ḥawrān for days at that time.80
In 1953, at the age of fifteen, Surūr joined the Muslim Brotherhood, later
explaining that the Muslim Brotherhood was “the only group that practices the daʿwa for
God” in his area: “not associating with this group means the correlation with apostate
jāhiliyya parties because the young people at that period were very interested in the
politics, and they felt that partisan affiliation is necessary.”81 Young Surūr found a
sanctuary in the Muslim Brotherhood from what he viewed as deviant thoughts of the
nationalist parties and the corrupted environment of students.
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When Surūr moved to Damascus in 1958 to pursue advanced studies, he had the
opportunity to work under the mentorship of some of the Muslim Brotherhood’s most
prominent leaders in Syria. He was heavily influenced by his professor Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī.
Al-Sibāʿī (1915-1964), the founder and general guide (al-Murāqb al-ʿām) of the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood, was also the founder and dean of the college of Sharīʿa in
Damascus who taught Surūr a personal status law course at the university. Surūr was
keen to attend his lectures, sermons, and political campaigns, in the process becaming a
strong advocate of Shaykh al-Sibāʿī’s ideas, especially the views he expressed in The
Socialism of Islam that shocked even some Muslim Brotherhood members as too
progressive.82 In his work, Al-Sibāʿī argued that with its social aspects, Islam teaches a
unique type of socialism: it shares with socialism the same goals and emphasizes basic
human rights: life, freedom, knowledge, dignity, and ownership.83 During this period,
Surūr also learned about Salafi ideas. He was very close to the Damascus camp of the
Muslim Brotherhood, among which included rising figures such as Zuhyr al-Shawīsh,
Muḥammad Surūr, and Muḥammad al-ʿAbdeh who were influenced by the emergence of
a more doctrinal and literalist version of Islam.84
Surūr’s Adoption of Salafism and Break from the Muslim Brotherhood
Surūr left Syria in 1965 as political activism became difficult under the repression
of the Baʿth party, which seized power in March 1963; he decamped to Saudi Arabia and
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commenced work as a teacher in the Scientific Institutes in Buraydah and Ḥāʾil and the
Eastern Province.85 Upon his arrival in Saudi Arabia in 1965, Surūr continued his
political engagement within the Muslim Brotherhood’s ranks. We do not know exactly
the nature of Surūr’s religious identity during this early period. He was very far from
being Ṣūfī (a Muslim mystic and ascetic) and never adopted a Ṣūfī order. He denied
accusations that he was an Ashʿarī, (Asharite), or a follower of Ashʿariyyah, an Islamic
theological school that uses reason in theological dispute on divine attributes and nature
of the Qurʾān, instead professing his ignorance of such creeds.86
We do know that Surūr’s religious outlook gradually shifted toward Salafism in
Saudi Arabia. This adoption proved a turning point in the life of Muḥammad Surūr, as it
propelled him toward his unique theological and political synthesis. Unlike many
expatriates, the young teacher was impressed by the Saudi lifestyle at the time, especially
by its simplicity. He also praised the religious establishment’s control of the country
social life and enforcement of strict observance of Islamic traditions on a daily basis,
such as closing businesses during working hours to facilitate prayers at mosques.87
Unlike many other Muslim Brotherhood refugees, Sheikh Surūr also exuded an openness
to influence and being influenced by the society around him. At the time of his arrival, he
began teaching at the Scientific Institutions, a six-year religious school that prepares
Saudi students for college founded in 1950 by the muftī Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Ibrahim
ibn Abd al-Latif Al-Shaykh (1890– 1969). According to its official websites, the
Scientific Institution set up “its curriculum based on the correct creed and manhaj of alMurājaʿāt with Surūr.
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87
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salaf al-ṣālih (methodology of the righteous ancestors) and iʿtidāl (moderation) without
ghulw (exaggeration) and jafāʾ (harshness).”88 Surūr thus joined the mainstream of the
Saudi Salafī-cum-Wahhābī ideological religious system.
Surūr found inspiration from the religious scientific tendency of the Salafī school
and broader religious and scientific trends among the students of these Islamic
educational institutions. Regretfully, he noted the absence of such a tendency among the
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria “because of their preoccupation with politics.”89 The Salafī
ideology appealed to him because of its emphasis on the superiority of ʿilm (religious
knowledge); students in these schools showed an extraordinary interest in studying the
religious sciences such as Ḥadīth, Qurʾānic exegesis, theology, and fiqh. Additionally,
Surūr was attracted by the creed of Salafiyya that emphasized the purity of belief from
bid’ (religious innovations) and from practices that deviate from the teachings of the
Prophet and his companions, such as veneration of saints. Unlike many other Muslims,
the Salafīs reject taqlīd (the following of the four canonical law schools) and emphasize
ijtihād (individual interpretation.) Instead, they rely on dalīl (proof from the Qurʾān,
Sunna of the Prophet and the consensus of the companions) as the basis of their
opinion.90 Surūr believed that this ideology, which claims a return to the ʿaqīda (creed)
and manhaj (Islamic method) of the al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (pious ancestors), provided him with
a more authentic model of belief and social action.91
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After working with the Muslim Brotherhood for more than ten years, Surūr
decided to break away and began to criticize the movement, even as he still bore the
traces and influence of his previous association. After spending a few years in Saudi
Arabia and under the influence of the Saudi religious circle, Surūr appreciated that “the
daʿwa must be through the creed and methodology of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (pious ancestors).”
However, many of his older Muslim Brotherhood compatriots did not share such an
interest. He affirmed that “I tried to reconcile between my new convictions and my status
within this group. But this is hard to achieve.”92 Surūr asserted that he could not
compromise on doctrinal errors of the Muslim Brotherhood and tirelessly tried to correct
false beliefs among its members.
On the doctrinal level, Surūr criticized issues of theological and jurisprudence of
the Muslim Brotherhood, condemning them for not adopting the Salafī creed (ʿaqīda) and
methodology (manhaj).93 He disdained the organization for being deviant and shallow
regarding religious knowledge and for its focus on politics at the expense of religious
knowledge (ʿilm) and purifying the creed (ʿaqīda). Surūr considered the purification and
correction of the creed of greater importance than a focus on politics.
Surūr’s critiques of the Muslim Brotherhood not only emanated from doctrinal,
methodological, or even political concerns, but also from disagreements on strategic
actions. He criticized the recruitment strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood for accepting
members regardless of their doctrinal background. Surūr also said he was fed up with the
“policy of gathering,” by which he meant that the movement combined many contrasting
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elements such as Ṣūfīs, Ashʿarīs, and Salafīs in one group. The policy had been
developed by al-Bannā who believed that Muslims should abandon their divisions and
wrote “we cooperate upon what we agree, and we excuse one another in what is
disagreed upon.”94 For Surūr, gathering Muslims around a noble political aim—
establishment of an Islamic state—without considering the correctness of the creed
amounted to a colossal mistake.
Surūr also condemned the multi-faceted nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. AlBannā perceived Islam as a “comprehensive system” that can apply in any political
context. He transformed his vision of Islam to his movement and defined it as “a Salafi
call, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, an intellectual
and scientific association, an economic company, and a social idea.”95 Surūr declared that
“such a mixture cannot be a basis for the unity of Islamic action. On the contrary, it leads
only to rivalry and division because Ṣūfiism is an anomaly and deviation from the
approach of the truth (manhaj al-Ḥaq.)”96
Additionally, he criticized the centralization and a hierarchic organizational
structure of the group. Surūr criticized rights that the Muslim Brotherhood conferred
upon the leader of the movement that in practice made him an absolute ruler. According
to the Muslim Brotherhood, obedience to the people who are in charge is part of
obedience to God and the Prophet. The leader of the association thus enjoyed the same
rights as the Khalifa of the Muslims, including listening and obedience and taking bayʿah
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(allegiance). Surūr lamented that these rights make the Brotherhood leader “a tyrannical
dictator.”97
Surūr mocked the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, saying they practiced absolute
rule within the group while being fascinated by democracy. Surūr felt frustrated by the
leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood for gathering people around the political goal of
establishing an Islamic state, then rejecting offers to take high positions in the
government on the pretext of illegitimate way. After ten years in the ranks of the Muslim
Brotherhood, he found out that “the goals and objectives they talked about were a mirage
because they missed a historic opportunity to reach power because the leaders were
fascinated by democracy until others from the enemies of God came and took advantage
of the opportunity.”98
Furthermore, Surūr condemned the stance of the Muslim Brotherhood for its
support of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and for siding with the Iranians in the Iraq-Iran
War. He described its attitude as “emotional, devoid of reading the events and its result.”
He added that none of the Islamists who welcomed the Iranian revolution ever read about
the beliefs of Shīʿites “Rāfiḍah” (rejectors), the term Surūr and many others applied to
Shīʿites because they do not recognize the first three Khalifs as the legitimate successors
of Prophet Muhammad and hold Ali as to be the first successor.99

97

Ibid., 50.
Ibid., 52.
99
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Finally, Surūr bitterly condemned the Syrian Muslim brotherhood after the
Ḥamāh massacre in February 1982 for entering into the National Alliance for Liberation
of Syria along with the dissident Baʿth faction led by notable archrivals of the Hafiz alAssad regime, Amīn al- Ḥafiz and Michel ʿAflaq, as well as the Arab Socialist Party of
Akram al-Ḥawrānī and other secular groups in exile. The brotherhood’s move put them in
opposition to the Fighting Vanguard, a splinter Islamist armed group which fought
against the regime.100 Surūr deemed the coalition of the Muslim Brotherhood with “the
infidel apostate parties” that did not share the same goals of implementing the Sharīʿa
illegitimate. He argued that although the leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood who
held the agreement sought to find interpretations from sīrah (biography of Prophet
Muḥammad) and fiqh to support their efforts, there is no proof justifying such a coalition.
He added that in the past, there had been many efforts to work and cooperate with
secularists; however, the previous attempts had been shown to fail.101 He expressed
surprise over the seeming contradiction that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would “fight
against a wing of the Baʿth Party and ally with another wing of Baʿth Party.” The Syrian
exile also expressed astonishment that the Brotherhood could achieve a coalition and
work with figures such as Michel ʿAflaq who, according to Surūr, is one of many “Abū
Jahl of this era.”102 With this statement, Surūr is comparing Michel ʿAflaq, the founder of
the Baʿth Party that seized power in 1963 in Syria and subjected the Muslim Brotherhood
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to ruthless repression, with Abū Jahl, one of the greatest persecutors of the early Muslims
in Mecca.
This marked rupture with the Muslim Brotherhood over doctrinal and political
differences also likely stemmed, at least in part, from Surūr’s exposure to and interaction
with various Saudi subjects. Despite their role in the modernization process in Saudi
Arabia, the Saudi government prohibited expatriate Muslim Brotherhood members from
political and religious proselytization to Saudis. This restriction was clearly aimed at
preventing any attempt to challenge the religious domination of the Wahhabi
establishment and forestalling friction or confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood
and local religious leaders. Generally, Muslim Brotherhood members in the Kingdom
obeyed the orders that required them to refrain from any political activities with Saudi
subjects. However, the ambitious Surūr challenged these strictures and met with Saudis,
who were influenced by his political ideas and became the backbone of the Ṣaḥwa.
Surūr’s activities caused, in his own words, “a heated war” with the Ikhwān (the Muslim
Brotherhood), which became the main reason for leaving the group, as we shall see
below.103
Surūr’s criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and adaptation of Salafiyya led to
animosity with other Muslim Brotherhood expatriates, a break which had an enduring
and painful personal consequences. According to Surūr, after leaving the Muslim
Brotherhood, he was subjected to “harassment and hostility” by the former group, stating
“I do not think that anyone in the Muslim world was wronged by his brothers and former
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companions as much as I was.”104 According to Surūr, the representative of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and the principle mediator between that group and the Saudi
government, Mannāʿ al-Qattān, played the decisive role in his ultimate expulsion from
the nation. Al-Qattān informed the Saudi authorities about Surūr’s activities, asking them
to end his contract and then to deport him from the kingdom. Surūr recounted that alQattān told him that “your presence in this country harms us.”105
Establishing His Own Path and Movement
After separating from the Muslim Brotherhood, Surūr decided to start his own
distinct group and theological orientation. Surūr created a new synthesis which combined
a vigorous commitment to the Salafī creed with the Muslim Brotherhood’s political
ambition of seizing power and enforcing Sharīʿa through state control. His activism took
place within Salafī circles and was directed toward gaining a foothold within it.
Furthermore, he adopted a new set of epistemological assumptions that defined his future
activism. Henceforth, Surūr still obviously reflected his early career in the Muslim
Brotherhood in some respects, but he also became decisively Salafī in others. During this
period, Surūr established his hybrid ideology as an influential trend in Saudi Arabia
during the 1980s and 1990s.
Since his thought played a crucial role in the development of the eponymous
Surūrī group and the broader Ṣaḥwa movement in general, it is important to discuss his
philosophy. The cornerstone of Surūr’s new guiding assumptions for Islamic activism is
104
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adherence to the ʿaqīda and manhaj of the al-salaf al-ṣalīḥ, by which he meant
understanding and practicing Islam in the same way of the first three generations of pious
Muslims.106 A central feature of his religious thought is his affirmation that Islam
comprises a total system, with politics component a part of this system, and cannot be
ignored. He wrote that “calling for the implementation of the Islamic Sharīʿa is one of the
most important issues and problems of this time. The conditions of Muslims will not
settle unless they submit to God’s orders in every aspect in their life. The acceptance of
the jāhilī laws is one of the nullifications of Islam.”107 He asserted that the call for
implementation of Sharīʿa should be consistent with the creed of the al-salaf al-ṣalīḥ.108
Despite the influence of his ideas, Surūr exhibited a reticence to play the role of
the leader of the new group because he did not see himself as “ʿālim mujtahid”
(independent jurist: one who can formulate an independent decision on legal and
theological matters), and because he did not want to “burden the reformist renewal
project with the responsibility for [his] previous mistakes.” Additionally, he believed that
the competition for leadership is one of the most serious problems facing the Islamic
umma: the preacher should only provide his experiences and talents and keep away from
the reins.”109 He also refused to give the new entity a name, because such a moniker
would inevitably lead toward partisan fanaticism (taʿaṣṣub), which becomes the main
obstacle to Islamic unity.110
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Surūr is known for his influence in the broader Ṣaḥwa movement that was colored
by his synthetic ideology in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Through his communications
and meeting with local people, Surūr observed that the Islamic current among the Saudis
lacked “the comprehensive sense that makes the Muslim have an Islamic impression over
everything.”111 In other words, he recognized the lack of political activism among
religious circles in Saudi Arabia, which were dominated by the Salafis and Wahhabis.
Infusing politics within the Wahhābī and Salafī lines was not an easy task, given the
purist and non-political stance of most of Wahhabis and Salafī strains, which emphasize
that politics is the main source of division within the Islamic community. It is important
to note that these two groups are in agreement on various matters, including eschewing
politics and criticizing Islamists movement for not adopting the creed and manhaj of the
Salaf. Surūr was aware that the domination of the Wahhābī tradition was unassailable in
his host country. By adopting a Salafī path, he was able to penetrate the conservative
community and promote his emphasis on political orientation.
As a teacher in the Scientific Institutions, Surūr inspired his students, some of
whom became the leaders of the Ṣaḥwa movement. Shaykh Salmān al-ʿAwda, a key
figure of the Ṣaḥwa, for example, was one of his students in the Scientific Institution in
Burayda.112 Certainly, Dr. al-ʿAwda was influenced directly or indirectly by Surūr’s
synthesis. Surūr’s meeting with the Saudi subjects was also an important factor in
spreading the Ṣaḥwa movement. In these gatherings, Saudis would be introduced to the
concept of al- ḥakimiyya (rule of God, sovereignty), the fundamental demand of the
Murājaʿāt.
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Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Surūr would talk about engagement in the partisan
wars and opposing “the secular invasion” in Syria.113 Surūr’s political thoughts circulated
among young Saudis, who found his political discourse more inspirational than the
traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ, whose teaching was limited to extirpating deviant religious
practice and whose political preaching was confined only to calls for total obedience to
the walī al-amr.
Within a short time, Surūr was able to build extensive public relation networks,
not only on the areas where he worked but also in the whole kingdom.114 Eager to learn
more about the modern world, the young generation undoubtedly also gathered around
Shaykh Surūr for the experience and organizational capabilities that he had acquired
through his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. Under his influence, al-Surūriyya
(Surūrism) gained an important foothold by the late 1960s and early 1970s, soon
dominating the intellectual and religious spectrum of Saudi Arabia between the 1980s
and 1990s.
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Chapter 3
Surūr: The Champion of Modern Anti-Shīʿism
After his expulsion from Saudi Arabia and relocation to Kuwait in 1973, Surūr
took a new interest in studying Shīʿism. Shīʿites constitute a significant minority in
Kuwait, and Surūr visited the ḥusayniyyat (congregation halls for Twelver Shīʿa Muslims
commemoration ceremonies, especially the mourning of Muḥarram and Battle of
Karbala), engaged in debates with Shīʿite imams, and met with exiled figures from the
Ḥizb al-Daʿwa al-Islāmiyya, an Iraqi Shīʿī political party. Through his examination of the
situation in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran, as well as his reading of Khomeini’s writings
and activities years before the Iranian Revolution, Surūr developed firm anti-Shīʿa
convictions that would provide the basis for a book, Wa jāʼa dawr al-Majūs [Then Came
the Turn of Majūs (Zoroastrians)], that was published under pseudonym in 1981. He was
one of the early polemicists who criticized the Iranian Revolution and warned against the
threat of Shīʿite domination of the Middle East. While anti-Shīʿī rhetoric was certainly
not unique to Surūr, his writings played his significant role in modernizing and
popularizing it by adding ethnic and political aspects. His writings were distinguished by
the addition of an ethnic dimension to his theological broadside, noting Persians’ betrayal
of the Islamic state from the early period of Islam to the modern day, stating that they
were the impetus for many uprisings and heretical groups.
Along with his anti-Shīʿa thoughts from the Wahhābīs and Salafis, who see
Shīʿism as a deviant sect, Surūr expressed a more political version of anti-Shīʿism,
including doubt about the aspirations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its alliance with
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the “ʿAlawī Syrian regime.” The political context of his homeland of Syria, and
especially the repression experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood under the Nusayri
(ʿAlawī) Syrian regime, clearly informed this anti-Shīʿī treatise and contributed to special
criticism of Syria’s Nusayris (ʿAlawis). Geopolitics and great power competition
continually appear in the text as Surūr argued that the Iranians, like their Persian
ancestors, had national ambitions in the neighboring Arab countries and sought to control
the region with the help of the Arab Shīʿite, who were seen by Surūr as a “fifth column.”
Soon after the revolution, Khomeini and his followers began talking about exporting the
Islamic revolution to other Islamic countries that are under secular corrupted regimes.
Surūr understood the aim of these announcements as Persian rafidas’ aspirations to
dominate the other side of the Gulf and Iraq by overthrowing the current regimes and
creating Shīʿī -dominated states.
Surūr stated that he began writing the book in 1976 and completed a few chapters
before the Iranian revolution. After following Khomeini’s writings and activities for a
long time, he said that it was clear that the cleric would play a leading role in Iran’s
future. He mentioned that the idea for the book did not stem only from the danger posed
by the Iranian revolution, but also from Arab Shīʿites, who started to build close links
with the Iranian regime from the time of the Shah and who took power in Syria.115 Surūr
published Wa-jāʼa dawr al-Majūs in 1981 under the pseudonym of ʿAbd Allāh
Muḥammad al-Gharīb when he was in Kuwait. The term majūs means Zoroastrians, and
in the early Islamic period, it translated to fire-worshippers. Surūr used the term in a
derogatory way and deployed it against Iranian Shīʿites to cast them as ersatz Muslims.
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As discussed in detail below, the book, which became very influential between the 1980s
and 1990s, warned of an Iranian Shīʿite plan to control the Middle East. He attacked the
Iranian Revolution and Khomeini, in process warning of the “Persian Majūsī rāfiḍī”
expansion into the Gulf, Iraq and the Levant, adding ethnic and political aspects to
modern anti-Shīʿism.
Surūr faced challenges in printing and distributing his anti-Shīʿite book. The book
was universally rejected by all the publishing houses in Kuwait and other Gulf states
because of its content. The book was only published in Egypt by a publishing house
owned by a Coptic Christian, but after the printing of the book, the Egyptian authorities
refused to release it until receiving permission from the rectors at al-Azhar University,
and even then, rejected distributing the book in Egypt. According to Surūr, he was able to
get the permission of al-Azhar through connections, perhaps without anyone actually
reviewing the book.116 In the beginning, the book was banned across the entire Arab
world. At the time, however, the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ in Saudi Arabia gathered to take a
stand on the Iranian Revolution. After one ʿalim suggested the book included all the
information they need to make their stance, however, the book gained the acceptance of
the Wahhābī establishment. Then, Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Bāz, Grand Mufti of Saudi
Arabia, decided to buy three thousand copies and distributed the book to his surrounding
circle before lifting the ban on the book in the Kingdom.117
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After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the book gained even greater notoriety
and influenced other anti-Shīʿa polemicists who saw the Shīʿa as a political threat;
subsequently, the ban on the text was lifted in most countries. Kuwait was one of the few
countries that did not lift the ban because of fear of provoking its significant Shīʿa
minority. Although penned under a pseudonym, the book was a source of danger for
Surūr because the authorities sought to punish those who held the book, and it was a
principal reason for his departure from Kuwait in 1984.118
Throughout Wa-jāʼa dawr al-Majūs, Surūr vehemently embraces anti-Shīʿi
rhetoric and promotes the idea that Khomeini’s pan-Islamic rhetoric constituted a
harbinger of imminent Shīʿī invasion and the “Shīʿite Persian menace” of Sunni lands.
One of the earliest opponents to warn against Khomeini and his rule before the Iran-Iraq
war, Surūr wrote that “Khomeini is more malicious than the Shah.”119 In the book, he
expresses views about the Iranian Revolution that diverged from mainstream Islamists.
He criticizes the statement of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood
welcoming the Iranian revolution and the position of the International Organization
supporting the Iranian side in the Iran–Iraq War. Surūr particularly lambastes the
Brotherhood for what he described as an emotional, theoretical position devoid of an
actual reading of events on the ground.120 He also condemns the attitude of other
Islamists who admired the revolution in Iran, including Abūʾl-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, a Pakistani
Muslim theologian and founder of the Islamist political organization called Jamaat-eIslami. Surūr argues that no one who supported the Iranian revolution read about the
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“aberration and deviations” beliefs of Shīʿites rāfiḍa.121 In sum, Surūr deplores the
ignorance of those Islamists who welcomed the Iranian Revolution and called for
cooperation with Khomeini.122 Throughout the book, Surūr refers to Khomeini and his
fellow Iranians as Persians to demonstrate the nationalist ambitions of Khomeini’s ideas,
in opposition to the Islamic solidarity that the revolutionaries alleged to advocate. Surūr
sometimes does not differentiate between the Twelver Shīʿa and other Shīʿa sects such as
Alawis and Ismaʿlis.
While anti- Shīʿī rhetoric was certainly not unique to Surūr, as noted above, his
writings were distinguished by the addition of an ethnic dimension to his theological
broadside. Surūr chronicles the Persians’ betrayal of the Islamic state from the early
period of Islam to the modern day, stating that they were the impetus for many uprisings
and heretical groups. Surūr claims that after the Muslim conquest of Persia in 633–654,
the majūs Persians converted to Islam only to undermine it from within: to orchestrate
conspiracies against Muslims that would eventually destroy their religion. According to
Surūr, the first attempt of majūs to achieve revenge against Muslims was the
assassination of the second Khalifa ʿUmar, who they hated because he was behind the
demise of their rule in the Sassanian kingdom and the destruction of their glory.123
Killing ʿUmar was a majūsi Christian plot perpetrated by a Christian Persian captive
brought to Medina, Abū Luʾluʾah al-Majūsi. Their campaign against the Khalifa ʿUmar
continued after his murder by cursing him, in accordance with the practices of Shīʿism.124
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Surūr claimed that Persians converted to Shīʿī Islam because of the compatibility of their
old Zoroastrian beliefs with Shīʿism in terms of the veneration and unyielding submission
to a holy family.125 He adds that the Zoroastrians converted to Shīʿī Islam because they
thought that Shīʿī Islam was derived from the Sassanian royal family: Ḥusayn, the
grandson of Prophet Muḥammad and the third Shīʿa Imām, had married a Sassanian
princess whose son became the fourth Imām.126
Surūr continued to see such suspect Persian machinations at work in the
ʿAbbāsids overthrow of the Umayyads in 750 and efforts to control the new Khalifate.
According to Surūr, Abū Muslim al- Khurasānī, a Persian general and the leader of the
ʿAbbāsid Revolution, began to look on the Caliph with disdain and exercised absolute
power, even aspiring to appropriate the Caliph’s position for himself.127 Like Abū
Muslim al- Khurasānī, the Persian al-Barāmikah family enjoyed considerable influence
under the early ʿAbbāsids, and according to the Syrian political activist, other Persian
figures sought to control Caliphs through intermarriage.
Surūr also contends that the endeavors of the Persians were not limited to efforts
to influence and control the caliphs; their impact penetrated several other areas. During
the ʿAbbāsid era, the Persians orchestrated many heretical movements that advocated the
“Manichaean doctrines.” Surūr gives an example of the rebellion of Al-Muqannaʿ, a
religious leader who carried out a revolt against the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Mahdī and called
for the “al-ḥulūl” (incarnation).128 He adds that Persians attempted to distort Islamic
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history and fabricate aḥadīth of the Prophet Muḥammad. They also sought to disparage
and criticize the al-Ṣaḥāba (Companion of Prophet Muhammad) such as Abū Bakr alSiddīq and ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. During this time, Surūr laments the Persians returned to
their old perceptions and customs, such as wearing turbans and celebrating majūsi
holidays like Nowruz.129
Surūr notes that ʿAbbāsid authority began to deteriorate in the third century when
Persian Shīʿa established independent “small states” across the broader Middle East in
Iraq, Iran, the Levant, and Egypt. These states were “aiming to keep Muslims away from
their religion…, to destroy the Islamic Caliphate, and to provoke ethnic tensions.”130 He
asks by what coincidence were the ethnic ancestors of the Qarāmiṭa (Qarmatians), the
ʿUbydiyyūn (Fatimids), the Būyahiyyūn (Buyids) all of Persian origins.131 He also points
out that the states of Qarāmiṭa 278 H (891 G), Fāṭimīyūn 296 H (909 G), Būyahiyīyūn
(Buyids) 334 H (945 G) were established in a relatively short time span, and their
doctrines were similar to the doctrines of Mani, Mazdak, and Zoroaster.132 For instance,
the Buyid dynasty, a Shīʿa Persian dynasty, “conquered Iraq in 334H (946 G), deposed
the ʿAbbāsid caliph” of Baghdad, attempted to enforce their particular religious view
upon their subjects, and “instigated sectarian strife between the Sunnis and Shīʿa.”133 In
Surūr’s view, the Persian majūs continued their plots and fighting against the ʿAbbāsid
Caliphate, spreading “al-kufr” (unbelief) and “al-Zandaqa” (heresy) until “Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn
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al-Ayyūbi came and cleansed the Levant and Egypt from majūsism, and returned the
Prophet’s sunnah to the Muslims.”134
Surūr argues that although these early states disappeared, their doctrines and
conceptions persisted in the beliefs of some Shiʿī bāṭinī groups that focus on an inner,
esoteric (bāṭin) meaning in the interpretation of religious texts. Surūr uses the term here
pejoratively, and argues that, after the demise of these states, bāṭinī groups continued to
be involved in clandestine activities:
The bāṭinīs were preparing themselves to come out of their burrows with their old
beliefs, which they changed only the names: the Ṣafawīs (Safavids), the Bahāʾīs,
the Qadyānīs (Ahmadis), the Durūz (Druze), the Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs), the
Ḥashashūn Ismāʿīlīs (Assassins). The bāṭinīs have returned to their normal role ...
to support the enemies of Allāh and to cooperate with them against Muslims.
They cooperated with Britain, Portugal, France, and Tsarist Russia. They returned
to tear the Islamic unity again.135
Surūr claims that all these groups belonged to Shiʿī origins and that the founders of these
sects including the Durūz and the Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs), centered primarily in the
geographic land of Levant, were majūs Persians.136
The political context of his homeland of Syria, and especially the repression
experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood under the Nuṣayrī (ʿAlawī) Syrian regime,
clearly informed this anti-Shiʿī treatise and contributed to special criticism of Syria’s
Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs). An early example of the Shīʿa bāṭinī sects, the Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs)
were founded by Muḥammad ibn Nuṣayr, who emerged first as an Imāmī Shīʿī. Surūr
claims that Ibn Nuṣayr was the first to conceive “the idea of the occulted Imām,” adding
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that Ibn Nuṣayr claimed that he is “the bāb” (door) of the occulted Imām, the intimate
disciple of the Imām.137 The Nuṣayrīs, likewise, believe in “transmigration of souls, the
eternity of the world, deny the resurrection and propagation, deny paradise and hell.” He
writes that they also believe that “Alī is the rabb (Lord), Muḥammad is the ḥijāb (veil)
and Salmān is the bāb (door). Iblīs al-Abālisa [the king of the devils] … is ʿUmar ibn alKhatṭā ̣b and below him in the rank of the devils is Abū Bakr and then ʿUthmān, may God
be pleased with them all.”138
Continuing from this theological critique to more specifically political
accusations, Surūr levels charges of treason against the ʿAlawīs for aiding the Christians,
the Tatars, and the French against the Muslims to occupy the Levant. Additionally, he
criticizes the actions and behavior of the Nuṣayrīs in the present. He writes that “they
control an important part of the Levant- Syria- and plan to eradicate Islam and Muslims if
the atmosphere is clear for them, and cooperate with Israel, Iran, and the United States of
America, and the Islamic scholars in the present and the past have agreed upon kufr
(heresy) of this sect.”139 Clearly, Surūr wants to stress the treacherous and heretical
nature of the sect in the history and provides a timely warning against what he perceived
as the expansionist aspiration of the ʿAlawīs in his own time.
In the second part of the book, Surūr reviews doctrines of the Shīʿites in the past
and present. The Salafī and Wahhābī influence of Surūr’s anti-Shīʿa thoughts is clearly
present in this part of the book. It is important to note that Salafis and Wahhabis provide
137
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the intellectual and religious groundworks of religious anti-Shīʿism. This part discusses
the doctrinal and religious error of the Shīʿa, arguing that Shī‘a believe in the idea of
altering the Qurʾān’s text. He criticizes Shīʿites on numerous points, including for their
contradiction of the Sunna, for believing in ʿiṣmah (immunity from sin, infallibility) of
the Twelve Imāms, for sabb al-Ṣaḥāba (cursing the Companions of the Prophet
Muhammad), for the endorsement in jaʿfari law of mutʿa (temporary marriage), and for
the Shīʿī theory and practice of taqiyya (dissimulation of the real religious belief and
practice in the face of persecution.)140
Surūr goes on to argue that the Shīʿites of modern times are more dangerous to
Islam than the Shīʿites of the past.141 In the first half of the twentieth century, there were
efforts by Shīʿa and Sunni figures to reach a kind of rapprochement between their two
communities. For this purpose, newspapers, magazines, and associations were established
by both sides. However, all these attempts largely failed.142 Surūr blames the Shīʿa for the
failure of these efforts because their ʿulamāʾ continued publishing books cursing the
Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad.143 Pointing to the concept of taqiyya, he
condemns the Shīʿa as untrustworthy and questioned their intentions in calling for
rapprochement and unity between Sunnis and Shīʿa. To Surūr, the Shīʿa adopted such a
conciliatory posture only as mask to implement their plans of disseminating Shīʿism
among Sunnis.144 He mentions the experience of Shaykh Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī and others,
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who participated in such efforts, citing their unpleasant comments.145 Surūr concludes
that the only way to achieve unity between the Sunnis and Shīʿa is “to get rid of their
polytheism and idolatry.”146
Surūr claims that through studying the history and doctrines of the Shīʿa, as well
as observing their news, he recognized that Iranian clerks organize the affairs of their coreligionists around in the world, who are first and foremost loyal to the political and
religious leadership in Iran, whether the ruler is the Shah or Khomeini. He also contends
that the dispute between the Shah and Khomeini did not have a significant impact on
members of the sect outside Iran.147 He notes that “the Nuṣayrī regime in Syria had close
connections with the deposed Iranian Shah and his regime, and these connections have
become closer and stronger with the new revolution led by Khomeini.”148 Surūr claims
that Muḥammad ibn Nuṣayr is of Persian origin and that the Nuṣayrī doctrines are similar
to the majūs ones. Therefore, he assumes that “the correlation of the Nuṣayrīs to Iran is
ethnic on one hand and doctrinal on the other.”149 There are no differences between the
Shah and Khomeini’s “foreign affairs and Persian aspirations on the neighboring
countries.” Like the Shah, “the leaders of the Khomeini revolution” claimed that the three
UAE islands are Iranian, the Gulf is Persian, and “demanded to annex Bahrain, Iraq,
Mecca, Medina, and Southern Lebanon. They sought to create a great Shīʿite empire that
extends to all Islamic countries under leadership of an Iranian murshid.”150 Clearly, Surūr
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is asserting that the political loyalty and religious authority of Arab Shīʿites is to Iran and
not their countries of residence, thus insisting upon the expansionist nature of the
Persians of Iran whether ruled by the Shah or Khomeini.
Geopolitics and great power competition continually appear in the text, as Surūr
argues that the Iranians, like their Persian ancestors, had national ambitions in
neighboring Arab countries and sought to control the region with the help of the Arab
Shīʿites. Soon after the revolution, Khomeini and his followers began talking about
exporting the Islamic revolution to other Islamic countries under corrupted secular
regimes.151 Surūr understands the aim of these announcements as Persian rāfiḍas’
aspirations to dominate the other side of the Gulf and Iraq by overthrowing the current
regimes and creating Shiʿī-dominated states. Ayatollah Ṣādiq Ruhānī, an Iranian marja
(religious authority), called for the annexation of Bahrain to Iran, renewing the historical
Persian demand for sovereignty over these areas. Surūr adds that the ambition of the
Persians in Bahrain and Iraq is traced back not only to the time of the Shah but also to
their pre-Islamic “majūs Persian ancestors.”152 After the victory of the Islamic
Revolution, these calls increased under the pretext of exporting the Islamic revolution
and supporting Arab Shīʿites, who are the majority in Bahrain and Iraq and a significant
minority in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, against persecution.153
Surūr sought to provide an especially urgent warning to those of his fellow Sunni
Islamists who might gravitate towards the revolutionary ideas of Khomeini as to what he
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perceived as the true intentions of the Shīʿites’ plans.154 He also seeks to degrade
Khomeini’s prestige and his revolution among Sunnis, portraying the Ayatollah’s panIslamic promises as publicity stunts belied by the cooperation of the Islamic revolution’s
leaders with the Americans, Israelis, and the Syrian regime. He describes Khomeini as “a
Shīʿite leader bigoted for his sect” who “calls [only] for a Shīʿite Islamic state and does
not mention the question of cooperation with the Sunnis or merger with them.”155
Furthermore, he argues that Khomeini believes that Islamic unity can be achieved only
through conversion of Sunnis to Shīʿism and their acceptance of the ʿiṣmah of Imāms. He
adds that in his book Islamic Government, Khomeini excludes the first three Rightly
Guided Caliphs as a model of the Islamic government, and this means not recognizing
them. 156 In his writings, Khomeini also detracts from the standing of the companion
Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān.157
In addition, the book goes even further to undermine the appeal of the Revolution,
describing Khomeini as an agent of the United States and Europe and depicting the
Iranian Revolution as an American product. Surūr argues that although Khomeini
continuously criticized the United States for Iran’s economic problems and supporting
the authoritarian regime of the Shah, he did not shut down the US embassy as he did the
Israeli Embassy after the revolution. He adds that Iranian oil exports continued to the
United States and the West as usual, and the revolution’s leaders did not even mind
exporting oil to Israel.158 Furthermore, Surūr argues that Khomeini set the theological
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basis that gave permission for collusion with the enemies. He notes that Khomeini issued
a fatwa that allowed providing aid for enemies, citing the actions of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī,
one of great Twelver Shīʿī scholar, who “put himself in the service of the Tatars
invaders” and aided the Mongol forces under Hulegu when he attacked Baghdad in
1258.159 As proof of Khomeini’s treason with the United States, Surūr details several
contacts and meetings between Khomeini himself and officials from the American
administration when he was in France.160 Surūr assumes that the US administration of
President Jimmy Carter orchestrated the Iranian Revolution, supporting his claim by
citing the memoirs of the Shah, Khomeini’s partners in the revolution and media
reports.161
Surūr was also one of the earliest Sunni writers who noticed the contention
between Khomeini and anti-Khomeini groups within Iran in the post-Revolutionary
period. He uncovers the clash between Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Muhammad
Kazem Shariatmadari, who was at odds with Khomeini regarding several matters such as
interpretation of the concept of the “Guardianship of the Jurists” (wilāyat al-faqīh), the
constitution, the system of government, and the occupation of the US embassy in
Tehran.162 However, followers of the Shariatmadari were suppressed, and Shariatmadari
himself was put under house arrest.163 Surūr repeats his warning for Sunni Islamists who
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sympathized with Khomeini, noting that he crushed his partners in the revolution and
even his fellow Shīʿites.164
Furthermore, Surūr tries to attack the pan-Islamic nature of Khomeini's vision by
questioning his solidarity with the Palestinian cause. He compares Khomeini’s speeches
and slogans with those of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had captured the
imagination of the Palestinians and Arabs in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Surūr,
Khomeini would let them down, as Abdel Nasser did.165 He also criticizes Yasser
Arafat’s welcoming position of Khomeini, reminding the Palestine Liberation
Organization how the “Syrian Nuṣayrī regime” had intervened in favor of the Maronites
against the Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims, siding mainly with Lebanese Shīʿa
represented by Shaykh Musa al-Sadr and Amal movement to the Syrian army.166 Surūr
also cites several statements by Iranian officials apologizing for their inability to provide
aid to the Palestinian liberation movement, with the excuse that Iran was now in critical
conditions.167 He insists that Khomeini will not fight Israel and that all his promises and
professed solidarity with the Palestinian cause only amounted to a ploy to gain popularity
among Sunnis. Another reason for Surūr’s criticism was the continuous purchase of
Israeli weapons by Tehran.168 Surūr argues that “the rulers of Tehran are more dangerous
to Islam than Jews... They will cooperate with the Jews in fighting the Muslims.”169 He
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adds that “those who are plotting against Iraq, the Gulf, Lebanon, and Syria will not fight
Israel.”170
All of these charges thus led Surūr to conclusion that Arab Shīʿites comprise a
“fifth column” for Iran and act as its tool to destabilize the region.171 During the Iranian
Revolution and after the return of Khomeini to Tehran in 1979, Shīʿites started
demonstrations in Iraq, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.172 Surūr talks about a plan to sweep
through the Gulf organized by Iranians and led by local Shīʿites who were originally
Persian.173 These movements were accompanied by smuggling and the distribution of
weapons among Shīʿites to cause disturbance in the Gulf.174 Surūr contends that many
Gulf Shīʿites today are originally Persian, and they only managed to buy their citizenship
in the 1950s when the Gulf states were still poor. Although they became citizens of these
states, their language, culture, and behavior remained irreducibly Persian. Surūr writes
that the Gulf Shīʿites “live with their bodies in the Gulf, but their hearts and minds live in
Tehran.”175
Surūr also articulates skepticism about the alliance between the secular Baʿathist
Syrian regime and the Iranian regime which claimed to speak on behalf of Islam. After
taking power in 1970, Hafiz al-Assad, an ʿAlawīte, relied on his family and sect in ruling
Syria, which led to revived discussion about the heretical character of the ʿAlawīs among
regime’s opponents. Hafiz al-Assad sought to obtain recognition from Musa al-Sadr, the
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Iranian-born Shīʿite cleric and founder of the Amal movement in Lebanon, who issued a
fatwa recognizing the ʿAlawīs as Shīʿī Muslims.176 The Islamic Revolution gave Islamists
in Syria an example of how an Islamist movement was able to overthrow one of the most
authoritarian regimes in the region. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood intensified their
opposition, and elements of it engaged in an armed conflict against the Syrian regime. So
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, who welcomed the Islamic revolution in Iran, might
seem to offer a natural ally for the new Islamic regime that promoted Muslim solidarity
as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Instead of supporting the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood, however, the revolutionary regime developed special relations with the
secular Syrian state and denounced the Islamic opposition. Surūr asks how Khomeini’s
followers criticized all regimes in the region except the Syrian government. He attributes
this betrayal to the confessional closeness between the Shīʿites of Iran and the Nuṣayrī
(ʿAlawī) regime of Syria.177 Another reason for their alliance was that the Syrian regime
provided support for the Shīʿites of Lebanon and sought to help them achieve their
aspirations, contrary to any professed sense.178 Surūr affirms that like the new Iranian
regime, the Syrian regime is “majūsi” and “rāfiḍi.”179 We can see here a political reason
for Surūr’s criticism of Khomeini and the Shīʿites.
Moreover, Surūr objects to the idea that only an Iranian can be the Supreme
Leader of the Shīʿites in the world. He declares that such a principle is not Islamic but a
majūsi practice, because Islam does not recognize national boundaries and
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nationalities.180 Surūr criticizes some fundamental principles in the 1979 Constitution
such as the stipulation that the President should be Iranian.181 Surūr also accuses
Khomeini of “setting up slaughterhouses” in every town and village in Iran and punishing
the opposition severely.182 Furthermore, as a result of the purge against the Shah’s
supporters and the opposition, Iran suffered from “brain drain.” The scientists, doctors,
dentists, and professors left Iran fearing torture and other abuses.183 He also discusses the
situation of Sunnis in Iran after the revolution, who suffered from persecution,
discrimination, and poverty as a result of marginalization and did not have access to
higher political positions.184 He condemns celebration of Nowruz (the Iranian New Year)
after the Islamic revolution in Iran, characterizing it as “a jahili majūsi holiday.” Before
the revolution, the followers of Khomeini “used to attack the Shah because he sought to
revive Persian majūsi habits and traditions which Islam annulled,” yet, the celebration of
Nowruz continued after the Islamic Revolution. Surūr asked how Khomeini forgot the
teachings of Islam and gave a speech on this occasion.185
Surūr attacked the Iranian revolution in the early 1980s, trying to assess the
effects and impacts of it on political and religious groups across the Arab Muslim world.
He tried to explore the imminent danger of the Iranian revolution as a harbinger Shīʿīte
expansion in Iraq and the Gulf. The Salafī and Wahhābī influence of Surūr’s anti-Shīʿa
thoughts is present in the book in its criticisms of Shīʿī doctrines and practice. However,
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he developed his own type of anti-Shīʿism grounded in ethnic and political antagonism,
illustrated for the most part by many historical examples of alleged betrayal of the rāfiḍh
against Islam and Islamic umma. Surūr counted a long list of what he called the
conspiracies of Shīʿī sects against Islam and aiding the enemies of the umma. In addition
to this book, Surūr penned other works like Amal and the Palestinian Camps and The
Condition of the Sunnis in Iran in his effort to unveil the danger of Khomeini’s ideology.
Surūr stated that his book and its anti-Khomeini views struck a dissenting note at
the very apex of Khomeini’s widespread appeal among Islamists. However, the book
surged in influence from the 1980s, continuing to 2000s. With the increasing Sunni-Shīʿī
tensions in recent decades, Surūr’s anti-Shīʿa thoughts have since commanded an even
wider audience. Some argue that Surūr’s views on Shīʿism and Iran became a reservoir
for several Salafi-jihadi ideologues and thinkers, laying the groundwork for intensified
the sectarian extremism in many parts of the Middle East like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.186
Nibras Kazimi for example, demonstrated the tremendous impact of Surūr’s book on the
treatise and speeches of the jihādīs. Kazimi argues that the book was the main influence
on Abū Muṣʿab al-Zarqāwī, the leader of al-Qāʿida in Iraq, who declared jihād against
the Shīʿites majority in Iraq.187
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For others, years after the Iranian Revolution, Surūr’s prophecy of Iranian Shīʿī
aspirations in the Arab world has become evident. Consequently, Surūr received
admiration and recognition as a writer who faced and forecasted Iranian plans to expand
in the region. Additionally, almost all the obituaries and eulogies for him on his website
from high profile Islamic individuals and Islamic organizations lauded his role in
unmasking the danger of Iranian “majūs” “rāfiḍa” and warning the “umma.” Finally, the
ultimate goal of the book is to persuade his fellow Islamists to not be deceived by
Khomeini’s thoughts. Thus, Surūr’s writings played a significant role in modernizing and
popularizing anti-Shiism by reawakening dormant confessional debates and adding ethnic
and political perspectives.
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Chapter 4
Debates with Saudi Salafīs
In the late 1970s, as Surūr established himself in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia faced two
severe challenges to its Islamic legitimacy and its security: the Iranian Revolution and the
occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The previous chapter explored Surūr’s
reaction to the Iranian Revolution and his anti-Shiʿi writings. The Saudi royal family, too,
reacted to these challenges by leaning more heavily on their Islamic credentials, adopting
stricter religious norms and supporting various Islamic causes. With Surūr out of the
country, his followers in Saudi Arabia maintained a relatively non-oppositional
relationship with the Saudi state for at least a decade and generated relatively scant
controversy. As mentioned before, they even distributed Surūr’s anti-Shi’i treatise once
he was safely exiled from the country.
However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 transformed these dynamics,
contributing to a notable deterioration in the relationship between the Saudi authorities
and the Ṣaḥwīs (the awakened; the people of Ṣaḥwa) over the intervention of foreign
troops in the Gulf War in the 1990s. The growing stridency and opposition of the Ṣaḥwīs
to the hosting of US military personnel on Saudi soil, however, did not merely lead to
government repression. As we shall see in this chapter, a backlash against Ṣaḥwī
stridency also led to the emergence a new Salafī group—the pro-regime and quietist
Jāmīs—as a reaction against the Ṣaḥwa, particularly its political tendencies, and its
oppositional activities to the Saudi government. Specifically, the Gulf crisis and the first
protests against the Saudi government in the 1990s reignited longstanding debates about
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the theological validity of Salafīs participating in politics. The debate between Surūr and
Ṣaḥwīs on the one hand, who advocated non-violent political activism, and the Jāmīs—or
as Surūr called them “ḥizb al-wulāt”—who adopted a quietist posture, sheds light on the
evolving discussion among Salafīs about the legitimacy of political engagement.
The chapter offers an understanding of Salafism that moves beyond the
stereotypes of radicalism, terror, and violence that permeates much of the academic
discussion about political Islam and religiosity in Saudi Arabia.188 Analyzing debates
among the non-violent Salafi strands in Saudi Arabia on different issues reveals the
diversity of views on matters ranging from religious reformism and politics to relations
between Muslim believers and their rulers. Although both Ṣaḥwīs and Jāmīs adhere to the
same overarching current of modern Salafism, with shared belief in returning to the
model of the Prophet and al-salaf al-saliḥ, fighting bidʿ (a plural of bidʿa; innovations)
and rejecting taqlīd, they nevertheless engaged in heated debates regarding the stances of
the Ṣaḥwīs on religious reform, the restoration of the importance of Sharīʿa in the
Kingdom, and a possible confrontation with potential secular influences in the Kingdom.
The most significant areas of conflict between the Ṣaḥwīs and their counterparts
were fiqh al-waqiʿ (jurisprudence of reality) and tawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya (the Oneness of
God’s governance/sovereignty). In the late 1980s and beginnings of the 1990s, the
Ṣaḥwīs appeared as the only practitioners of the fiqh al-waqiʿ, which is an old concept
that was revived by Sururis and used as a tool for religious reform and enhancing their
momentum over other groups. It requires Muslim scholars to acquire secular knowledge
188
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in addition to religious knowledge in order to reformulate an accurate ruling or fatwa and
gain a good view of the world. However, Jāmīs saw the concept as a threat aimed at
destabilizing the authority of Sharīʿa and the prestige of traditional Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ.
During the same period, the Ṣaḥwīs began to propagate the concept of ṭawḥīd alḥākimiyya, which provided them the theological justification for their claim that the
Saudi government was insufficiently Islamic, a claim which elicited the opposition of
Jāmīs who saw the concept as a theologically unacceptable bidʿa (innovation).
To elucidate this sharp polarization between the Ṣaḥwīs and Jāmīs, this chapter
will explore writings from both sides of this Salafi divide. On the Jāmī side, the opinion
of Dr. Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, author of dozens of books and lectures, will provide
insight into the fierce denunciations and methodological refutations aimed against the
Ṣaḥwīs during the 1990s. On the opposite side, we will examine the Ṣaḥwīs’ responses to
Jāmī’s criticism by reviewing the writing of their chief protagonist, the exiled religious
leader, Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr, who after 1984 found refuge in the United Kingdom.
Even in absentia, Surūr wrote a series of widely read articles in his magazine al-Sunnah
defending the Ṣaḥwīs what he referred to as the “free centrist Salafīs.” He also criticized
those Salafis who provided unconditional support to the government in its conflict against
the Ṣaḥwi, labelling this with them with the epithet “ḥizb al-wulāt (loyalist party.)
The magazine al-Sunnah provided Surūr with soft power, allowing him to gain
more followers and attack opponents. It was concerned with political affairs in the
Islamic world more than religious studies and formulated political events from Surūr’s
Islamic point of view. Al-Sunnah is known for criticizing Arab governments, and thus it
was banned in most Arab countries. Despite the ban, the magazine was smuggled,
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reprinted, and distributed by the Ṣaḥwīs, some of whom wrote in Al-Sunnah under
pseudonyms.189 During the Gulf crisis, Al-Sunnah gained wide popularity among the
Ṣaḥwīs when the magazine increased its opposition to the Saudi regime. Al-Sunna
Magazine’s denunciations of the Saudi regime culminated in an article by Shaykh
Muḥammad Surūr entitled “Al-Irāhb Al-Saʿūdi” (Saudi Terrorism) in 1994, condemning
the campaign of arrests against key figures in the Saḥwa, like Shaykh Salmān al-ʿAwda,
and Shaykh Safar al-Ḥawālī.190 Shaykh Ṣaliḥ al-Fawzān, member of the Committee of
Senior Ulama and sworn enemy of the Ṣaḥwa, declared Al-Sunnah more dangerous to the
umma than drugs because its content undermines the unity of the Muslim umma and
instigates fitna. He warned the Muslims not to be deceived by the name of the
magazine.191
Challenges to the Saudi State in the 1980s
To understand the polarizing debates between Ṣaḥwīs and Jāmīs in the 1990s, one
first needs to understand the broader historical backdrop of challenges confronting the
Saudi state. First, the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979 constituted a serious challenge
to Saudi Arabia’s effort to gain primacy in the Muslim world. As discussed in chapter 3,
the new Iranian leaders claimed to represent Islam and wanted to export the Islamic
revolution to other Muslim countries including Saudi Arabia. Such revolutionary stances
proved profoundly threatening to the Saudi regime, which had long claimed a position as
the only genuinely Islamic state and true representative of the global Islamic
189
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community.192 Yet, at the same time, the Saudis also confronted a challenge not only
from the Shīʿite revolution in Iran, but also from militant Salafis like al-Jamaʿa alSalafiyya al-Muḥtasiba, a violent group led by Juhaymān Al-ʿUtaybī that seized the
Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979. Al-ʿUtaybī specifically condemned the
Saudi royal family for its corruption and alliance with the Christian states of the West. In
addition, he attacked the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ for bolstering the rulers and failing to
condemn its policies that went against Islam. Through seizing the Meccan Grand
Mosque, Al-ʿUtaybī was asserting that the royal family was unfit to serve as custodians
of the holy cities of Islam.193
Under the pressure of these events from multiple directions, Saudi Arabia’s
leaders felt compelled to yield to the increased demands of the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ in
exchange for their continued political quiescence. Specifically, the regime abandoned its
effort to cultivate an image of Islamic modernizers and instead did the bidding of
Wahhābī establishment by helping to enforce an austere public interpretation of public
dress and comportment. The government conferred more power upon the Committee for
the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, for example, by allowing them to
enforce a strict observance of Wahhābī principles in public places, such as enforcing the
closure of businesses during prayer time.194 In its effort to enhance the religious
credibility of his regime, King Fahd also contributed to the jihād in Afghanistan after the
Soviet invasion in 1979 and adopted the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Cities
(Khādim al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfayn) in 1986. Through such actions, the Saudi monarchy
192
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hoped to outmaneuver challengers by responding to Iranian revolutionary rhetoric abroad
and bolstering its image as the defender of Islam at home.195
In this precarious political moment, however, the Saudi state did not seek to
undermine all politicized Salafi; to the contrary, they sought to isolate the groups
responsible for occupying the Grand Mosque in Mecca by increasing their support for
other religious groups with sway. Indeed, outside the Wahhabi establishment, much of
the Saudi government aid went to groups associated with the Ṣaḥwa movement, including
the Surūrīs. The Saudi authorities initially sought to enhance the influence of the Ṣaḥwa
by providing more support to their activities such as summer camps and Islamic scouts.196
Indeed, why try to undermine a group and its spiritual leader, Surūr, who were so
vociferously opposed to one of the Saudi state’s main antagonists, the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Furthermore, they allowed the Islamist groups to operate freely with little
oversight. The Surūrīs and other Ṣaḥwīs took advantage of the relative freedom to
develop their networks. By the 1990s, they had gained momentum and dominated the
political and social life in the kingdom as an estimable rival to the Wahhabi elite.197
However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 brought the relationship
between the Saudi government and the Ṣaḥwīs to a crashing halt. The Saudi royal family,
concerned about Saddam Hussein’s ambition to continue his invasion all the way into the
Kingdom, invited Western troops onto its territory as a necessary measure to protect the
country from aggression. To justify this move, the Saudi rulers sought a fatwa from the
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Wahhābī establishment of officially employed ʿulamāʾ to authorize permission for nonMuslim troops in Saudi Arabia to fight against other Muslims. The Council of Senior
ʿulamāʾ, headed by Mufti ibn Bāz, who commanded great prestige among all Saudi
religious circle, issued a fatwa permitting the rulers’ efforts.198 This fateful decision
incited considerable backlash against the Kingdom for many years, especially among
radical groups like al-Qāʿida, who used the presence of US troops as justification for the
9/11 attacks. However, a much wider and non-violent strata of politically-engaged Salafis
also fiercely opposed this invitation to American troops, particularly the Ṣaḥwīs and
various other upstart popular preachers. All these groups criticized the fatwa for allowing
the intrusion of non-Muslim forces into the Kingdom to protect the holiest places,
believing that the Western military intervention would increase foreign, non-Muslim
domination. Although the Ṣaḥwīs had condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and
potential march into Saudi Arabia, at the same time, they also condemned the Saudi
decision to call American troops for help against Saddam Hussein.
Criticism of the introduction of US troops into Saudi Arabia catalyzed a wideranging Islamist oppositional movement against the authority of the Saudi royal family
and Wahhābī establishment. This movement soon brought two young influential religious
figures, who are often referred to as Surūrīs, Shaykhs Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān alʿAwda, to the fore as new leaders. Soon known as Shuyukh al-Ṣaḥwa (Shaykhs of the
awakening), these two figures helped spearhead the movement by expressing their
objections through Friday sermons, pronouncements, letters, and petitions. Two young
198
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influential Shaykhs emerged as the leaders of the Islamist opposition movement within
Saud Arabia.199
These two young leaders, in turn, spearheaded the Letter of Demands and the
Memorandum of Advice, which crystallized mounting protests and attracted the
signatures of hundreds of Ṣaḥwa figures before their final submission to the king and
mufti Shaykh ibn Bāz in 1991 and 1992. These petitions demanded the implementation of
comprehensive reforms to Saudi state apparatuses, including modification of the political
system within the boundaries of sharīʿa.200
While this movement briefly flourished after the arrival of US troops in 1990,
mobilizing a large number of young people, as we shall see, it quickly lost its momentum.
The Saudi government responded by taking a firmer stand against the Ṣaḥwīs and
suppressing the shaykhs of Ṣaḥwa. In 1994, the government started to arrest the most
important figures, including shaykhs Salman al-ʿAwda and Safar al-Ḥawālī. Even more
damaging, however, this brief resurgence of an independent, politically-minded, but also
non-violent Salafism in the form of an energized Ṣaḥwa movement also soon engendered
a deep backlash not just with state officials, but also across the spectrum of devout
Muslims. In particular, a new movement known as the Jāmīs, a separate group from the
Wahhābī establishment that preached devotion to the Saudi state, rather than protest,
would arise.
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The Counter Ideology (Jāmī Movement)
On the eve of the Gulf War, the Jāmī movement emerged as a potent
countervailing force, loosely subscribing to the overarching framework of Salafī Islamic
beliefs yet reacting against other Salafis like the Ṣaḥwa movement who engaged in
opposition to the Saudi government and the traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ. In particular,
the Jāmī developed a reputation for their severe criticism of the Ṣaḥwa and any other
Islamist movements that dared mount political opposition against the religious legitimacy
of the Saudi regime while providing support of the Saudi regime’s policies and acts. This
position emanates from the principle of listening and obedience to walī al-amr (the ruler).
Ultimately, this new movement leveled criticism not just against their immediate
antagonists among the Sahwa movement, including Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān alʿAwda, but also a broader pantheon of famous intellectual luminaries of political
Islamism, including renowned figures such as Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutḅ.
The “Jāmī” specifically derives from the name of an important cleric, Shaykh
Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī who was born in Ethiopia in 1930 and later emigrated to
Saudi Arabia. He chaired the Faculty of Ḥadīth at the Islamic University of Medina until
his death in 1995.201 As with the Surūris, the members of this backlash movement did not
explicitly choose or embrace the term “Jāmīs,” but instead had it foisted upon them by
their antagonists.202 For many Ṣaḥwīs, labelling their antagonists as “Jāmī” had the effect
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of undermining their legitimacy by associating them with a “foreign” Ethiopian Shaykh.
The group is also referred to as “Scholastic Salafis” (al-Salafiyyah al-ʿIlmiyyah.).203
However, despite such efforts to tarnish the group as foreign, the most wellknown Jāmī figure is Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, born in 1931 in the Jizan Province of
southern Saudi Arabia. He began to study at his village schools when he was eight years
and later continued his education at the Al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmī (Scientific Institution) in
Saamitah. In 1960, he joined the Faculty of Sharīʿa in Riyadh before moving in 1961 to
the Islamic University of Medina, where he studied under ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz (1909–
1999), Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914–1999), and Muḥammad Amīn alShanqītī.̣204 Al-Madkhalī specialized in the field of ḥadīth, particularly al-jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl
(disparagement and praise), which is a method to evaluate narrators of ḥadīth. However,
during the internal polarization of the 1990s, al-Madkhalī deployed this religious
knowledge as a tool to criticize his political adversaries.205
Al-Madkhalī held a particular literalist interpretation of Islamic sources that
distinguished him even among Salafis. He was especially attracted to the teachings of
shaykh Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Albānī, whom the International Crisis Group noted in
a 2004 report “had founded a school of Islamic thought that views the Ḥadīth as the sole
basis for religious decisions” and “rejected all schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh),
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including Wahhābīsm, insofar as they involved a degree of human judgment.”206 This
school of devotion to a literalist interpretation is often referred to as “Ahl al-Ḥadīth” in
reference to the medieval school that emerged in the 8th and 9th century. Devotees of the
Ahl al-Ḥadīth focus on purifying the faith from bidʿ (pl. of bidaʿa innovations) and
teaching Muslims about their religion, but also issuing condemnations of those who
pursue political participation.207 In order to spread their views, the Jāmīs used the same
methods utilized by Ṣaḥwīs, such as cassette tapes, websites, pamphlets, books, and
conferences.208 Asserting that all Arab political regimes are legitimate, the Jāmīs thus
argue that it is a religious obligation for Muslims to offer unconditional obedience to the
walī al-amr (the ruler). The only political action they deem acceptable is the provision of
secret and private advice for the rulers behind palace walls.
Linked to this notion of the listening and obedience, the Jāmīs also advocated for
quietism in part because they regard politics and political machinations as the main
sources of fitna (internal strife) that afflicted the Muslim community across history. Thus,
this group labelled anyone who opposed the Saudi regime as a Khārigī (Kharijite, one
that departs), a Muslim secessionist sect that appeared after the battle of Ṣiffīn between
ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the fourth caliph, and Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, governor of Syria,
in 657, and a term in the contemporary lexicon that denigrates those who oppose a
legitimate Islamic rule.209 Not surprisingly, experts like Meijer, have argued that the
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Jāmīs gained most of their religious authority from the tazkiyat (recommendations) of
those leading Wahhabi and Salafi scholars at the apex of the religious pyramid, such as
Shaykhs Ibn Bāz and al-Albānī.210 Therefore, the Jāmīs insisted that they did not
comprise a political party or group, but instead encouraged their followers to remain
strictly apolitical in their daily affairs.
The Jāmīs developed theological refutations aimed at famous international
Islamist figures such as al-Banna and Qutḅ as well as their followers among wider
Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Tablīgh. These theological
refutations often devolved into slander and vilification of those groups that did not share
the Jāmī’s approaches to Salafism. This vociferous criticism started with an attack against
the Muslim Brotherhood, who they saw as the main source of mixing Islam with politics
and which of course had been an early inspiration for figures like Surūr. Al-Madkhalī
claimed that “The Muslim Brotherhood is more harmful to Islam than the real kuffar
(unbelievers) because the Muslims are not deceived by kuffar, but they are deceived by
those misleading innovators who lead people going astray.”211 Shaykh Rabīʿ b. Hādī alMadkhalī also warned in his writings about the danger of the Muslim Brotherhood and
other Islamist groups infiltrating Saudi Arabia. Al-Madkhalī blamed the Muslim
Brotherhood for seeking to “distort the Salafī methodology,” effect the “extinction [of]
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the light of tawḥīd,” and obtain the “replacement with their rotten methodologies (such
as) methodology of the Ikhwān and Qutḅīs.”212
The Jāmī critique extended to include the most prominent thinkers behind the
Muslim Brotherhood such as Sayyid Qutḅ. Al-Madkhalī declared that “the heads of
contemporary ahl al-bidʿ” (the people who commit blameworthy innovations) and “the
heads of ahl al-fitan” (the people who cause and instigate strife) are Sayyid Qutḅ,
(Ḥasan) al-Bannā, Mawdudi, and Ḥasan Turābī.213 Al-Madkhalī wrote four books against
Qutḅ and his ideas, refuting the core precepts of his thoughts such as the idea of
jahiliyyah. Furthermore, he accused Qutḅ of practicing takfīr (excommunication) of the
Islamic communities, calling for socialism, rejecting the attributes of Allāh, and believing
in the creation of the Qurʾān, which is a doctrine coined by the Muʿtazila (Mutazilites)
who believed that the Qurʾān is created by God and was not eternal, uncreated, and the
words of God as most mainstream Muslims of the day believed. He also accused Qutḅ of
propagating the blasphemous principle of waḥdat al-wujūd (Unity of Being), which is
one of the major ideas of Ṣūfism.214 While al-Madkhalī did not pronounce takfīr against
Qutḅ explicitly, the observer can see in these condemnations of Qutḅ an implicit takfīr.
According to the Salafi view, whoever believes in the creation of Qurʾān or waḥdat alwujūd commits kufr (apostasy) and will be out of Islam.
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Surūr’s Counterattack and Defending the Muslim Brotherhood and Qutḅ
At the time of the fierce Jāmī backlash against the Sahwa, Surūr had not
disappeared from the intellectual or theological scene, despite his physical absence from
Saudi Arabia. In 1984, Surūr moved to the United Kingdom as an investor in publishing
and distribution coming from Kuwait. In Birmingham, he established the publishing
house “Dar al-Araqam” and the “Center for Islamic Studies.” In 1989, he also founded
the al-Sunnah magazine, which became a platform to express his views and attitudes
towards political issues and events.215 From his new exile, Surūr was one of the earliest
figures to comment upon the origins and rise of this new Jāmī movement, as well as to
advance a full-fledged rebuttal of its theological approach. By the mid-1990s, Surūr
churned out several extensive criticisms and observed that Jāmī rhetoric consisted of two
main pillars: first, unconditional support for the royal family, and second, a campaign of
vilification against political Islamists such as al-Bannā, Qutḅ, the Muslim Brotherhood
and al-Tablīgh. Surūr responded to this criticism with inflammatory accusations of his
own, criticizing the Jāmīs for manipulating and betraying the true Salafī creed, as well as
performing espionage for the Saudi regime.
In his writings, Surūr called the Jāmīs ḥizb al-wūlāt or “party of the loyalists,”
mocking their exhortation to full obedience and complete submission to wūlāt al-amer
(the ruler). Surūr admitted that the loyalists agree with other Salafīs about foundational
theological creeds, but they disagree with them about their advocacy for unconditional
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loyalty toward the rulers, claiming that in so doing, the Jāmīs even violate Islamic law.216
Surūr observed that the loyalists tried to tar all criticism with the brush of unlawful
“innovation” and also accused all those who disagreed with them of being “Qutḅists,”
“Surūris,” and “Ikhwān.”217
Beyond their devotion to the Saudi state and what he perceived as their flawed
interpretation of Islamic doctrine, Surūr embraced a more specifically geostrategic
argument, contending that the Jāmī provided a useful tool for American aims in the
region. For instance, he noted that the Jāmī movement only emerged after the Gulf War
and the rise of the United States as the ruler over a “New World Order” directed at
subjecting the Middle East to its control. According to Surūr, the United States
understood that the only groups that could really thwart their aims of hegemony in the
Middle East were politically engaged Islamists and Salafists. Therefore, it made sense
that the US would seek to defuse such threats and mobilize public opinion by impugning
Salafīs as fundamentalist terrorists. However, Surūr also believes that the United States
sought to weaken Islamist politics by sowing internal dissension and weakening any
Salafi organization that maintained autonomy from their ally, the Saudi State. The Jāmī,
in particular, contrary to their outward appearances of scriptural literalism, in fact, served
American agendas by undermining the forces of political Salafism and thus helping “to
lay the roots of secularism and remain loyal to the enemies of Islam.” 218
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Surūr also drew attention to what he perceived as the contradiction between Jāmī
rhetoric and their actual practices. Specifically, he argued that the Jāmī stance of rejecting
politics concealed the reality that they themselves embraced the tools of a modern
political party. For example, even though the Jāmī loyalists denounced politics and the
political parties as the source of blameworthy “innovation” (bidʿa), they nonetheless
embraced the structure of a political party “with popular base, leadership, methodology,
and goals.”219 More recently, academic researchers have also drawn attention to this gap
between a professed opposition to politics and the reality of political mobilization. Khālid
Mushawaḥ, an expert in Islamist movements, argued that the Jāmī group began to assume
a ḥarakī character, with a large number of its followers organized around and receiving
orders from a centralized leadership–the very attributes to which they supposedly
expressed unyielding opposition.220 Meijer also recognizes this paradox. He argues that
“[f]or although it pretends to be apolitical or even anti-political and is against internal
strife (fitna) within the umma, which supposedly results from politics and machinations,
the movement itself uses instruments of power to obtain hegemony in the transnational
Islamic movement and ultimately becomes itself a political movement, provoking
resistance and ultimately fostering internal strife.”221 Intentionally or unintentionally, the
Jamis engaged in precisely the same activities for which they criticized other Salafis.
They committed the same actions that they warned against, practicing politics and
promoting division within the Muslim communities.
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Surūr thus made the argument that the main feature of the loyalists is not their
detachment from politics, but rather, their hostility to specific political Islamist
movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Surūr acknowledged that
there are flaws and shortcomings in the Muslim Brotherhood’s methodology, as
discussed in chapter two, he does not find justification for Jāmī loyalists to engage in
such ad hominem attacks against them, noting the organization still belongs to the Ahl alSunah wa al-Jamaʿa (the Sunnis; lit. people of the tradition of the Prophet and
community).222
Surūr thus devoted a portion of his condemnation of the Jāmīs to specifically
refuting their attacks against Sayyid Qutḅ. Surūr admitted that he admired Qutb for his
steadiness/inalterableness on the truth, boldness in facing the ṭāghūt (despot, idol), and
knowledge. Surūr denied that Qutḅ was Ṣūfī, muʿtazla, Ashʿari, an advocate of the
concept of wahdt al-wujud, or an extremist. At the time, Surūr admitted that Qutḅ had
made mistakes in some religious issues, which is normal and not necessarily meriting
extreme condemnation according to Surūr, because Qutḅ is only human and does not
have ʿiṣma (infallibility) like prophets.223
Throughout his writings, Surūr evokes a sense of surprise at the Jāmī campaign
against various political Islamists, particularly their equation of the culprit (the ruler) with
the victim (the Islamists), and questioned how they support the ruler against the Islamists.
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Surūr further amplified his criticism by likening the position of the Jāmīs with that of
secularists, particularly in terms of their complete alignment with the views of the Saudi
government on which groups they support and which groups they oppose.224 Most
damningly, Surūr charged that Jāmī loyalists invoke the Salafī call but strip it of all its
spirit and betray its meaning.225
Surūr argued that the efforts of the Jāmī loyalists are directed mainly to
monopolizing the Islamic arenas, believing that “they are responsible for the Salafi call”
so they can include whoever they like and exclude whoever they dislike.226 They put
themselves in charge to combat the deviations of the Islamists, using the principle of aljarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl (disparagement and praise). Surūr argued that condemnation of
innovations was done through exaggeration of mistakes of the duʿāt (preachers) and
Islamist groups. They began a campaign against the antagonists from the Islamists,
looking for mistakes or religious errors in their writings and lectures. Once they see a
mistake done by an Islamist, they call him mubtadʿ (a person of innovation). Then, they
wage public smear campaigns against this antagonist.227 Furthermore, Surūr accused the
loyalists of espionage for the Saudi royal family, claiming that their writings, audiotapes,
and lectures became reports against their rivals such as Surūris and other Ṣaḥwīs to the
intelligence services. Surūr mentioned that the Jāmī loyalists wrote a long report
submitted to the Saudi Interior Minister under the title “the International Secret
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Organization between Planning and Implementation in Saudi Arabia” in the middle of the
1990s. The report recommended state authorities take measures against their Ṣaḥwī
opponents because they pose a danger to the Kingdom. Surūr stated that this report
contained a lot of lies and fallacies against the Islamists in Saudi Arabia.228 Furthermore,
Surūr described “the loyalists” with ahl al-ahwāʾ (the people of desire) because they are
driven by their whims and passions.229
Surūr’s Anti-Jamī Campaign: Condemning the Wrong and Rejecting Total
Obedience
In response to this vehement criticism, the Jāmīs excoriated Surūr himself for
abandoning Saudi Arabia to live in the West, for his lack of ʿilm (knowledge), for not
respecting ʿulamāʾ and for criticizing the rulers. The Jāmīs, who called for complete
obedience for the rulers in everything, accused Surūr of “intellectual terrorism” because
he described the ʿulamāʾ as slaves at the service of the ruler for their fatwa permitting the
aid of non-Muslim troops in the Gulf War.230 The Jāmīs believed that the political
authority in the Kingdom should make the decision on the behalf the nation. Opposing
the Saudi monarchy and rebellion against it constitutes forbidden acts.231 On the contrary,
they believe that Surūr, as well as everyone in the world, owe love, appreciation, and
respect for the ʿulamāʾ and rulers of the Kingdom.232
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Zayd b. Muḥammad b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, Al-irhāb wa-athāruhu ʿalā l-afrād wa-l-umam (Terrorism and
its Effects on Individual and Nations) (United Arab Emirates, 1418 (1997), 76-77,
http://www.ajurry.com/vb/showthread.php?t=18641.
231
Abdel-Latif, “Trends in Salafism,” 74.
232
al-Madkhalī, Al-irhāb wa-athāruhu, 77.
229

82

Expectedly, Surūr did not stay quiet in the face of these reprisals. In response to
Jāmī criticism of young generation of Ṣaḥwī preachers, he defended the Salafī status of
these upstart ʿulamāʾ, asserting that “they are Salafīs in fundamentals and branches and
this is clear for everyone who reviews from their writings and explores their positions.
They have had a significant role in the interpretation of the creed of Ahl al-Sunah wa alJamaʿa, refuting the misconceptions of the enemies of Islam.”233 They also have
contributed, according to Surūr, to the struggle against “the innovators,” “khawarj,” and
“al-ghulāt.”234 Surūr defended the Ṣaḥwīs’ oppositional activities during the Gulf War by
invoking a principle that he believed transcended loyalty to the ruler, specifically, the
principle of “condemning the wrong.” He added that by writing and signing various
petitions, which were also signed by a broad spectrum of other senior Muslim scholars,
these young ʿulamāʾ did not infringe upon the approach of the pious ancestors in the past
and present.235
Surūr followed up on this idea of “condemning the wrong” by demonstrating his
jurisprudential view on a host of issues concerning the legitimacy of the ruler, potential
rebellions against him and the position of the scholars. Recognizing that it is mandatory
to uphold the principle of “listening and obedience of the ruler in case the ruler imposes
the sharīʿa on his subjects,”236 Surūr nevertheless believed that the obedience to the walī
al-amr is still conditional on his maintenance of “al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-nahy ʿan alSurūr, “Naḥwa Kiyān Jadīd (22),” 62.
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munkar” or commanding good and forbidding wrong. “Obedience,” according to Surūr,
“does not mean acquiescence, tyranny, and oppression.”237 Surūr denied the principle of
giving private, discreet advice behind the palace walls adopted by the Jāmīs and the
traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ. For Surūr, it is unacceptable for the advice to be secret; as
long as the violation of the sharīʿa was in public, then the advice should be in public
too.238
Surūr elaborated upon his opinion of the ʿulamāʾ who support political rulers by
distinguishing between two types. He argued that after the abolition of the Khalifate, the
rulers of the Muslim countries replaced the provisions of Islamic law with ignorant
European law. The rulers also practiced a “gagging policy against their people and
distributed injustice, corruption and disintegration everywhere.” 239 He also lamented that
in modern times, the ʿulamāʾ no longer possess the freedom to write, preach and give a
religious verdict.240 Surūr distinguished between two types of ʿulamāʾ who provide
support to the rulers. The first category of the ʿulamāʾ support the ṭāghūt (despotic ruler)
and issue fatwas that contradict the sharīʿa, including rulings that effectively legalize
“usurious banking” and justify “bloodshed of the (Ṣaḥwī)ʿulamāʾ.”241 The other group of
ʿulamāʾ might be fooled by the ruler who seeks to take advantage of their knowledge,
honesty, and popularity among the people for their purposes. The ruler insists on these
ʿulamāʾ accepting high positions in the religious field, promising them the cooperation of
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the state to execute reforms in the Kingdom. After the fall of these ʿulamāʾ into the trap
of the ruler, they begin to change their attitudes and opinion regarding many issues, often
remaining silent. These ʿulamāʾ justify their new discourse and silence in terms of the
fear that the Kingdom might otherwise fall into fitna (internal strife); they also contend
the situation in Saudi Arabia is better than in neighboring countries.242
Surūr discussed the silence of some ʿulamāʾ and their refusal to clearly state any
legal opinion on the violation of rulers against the sharīʿa for fear of abetting a descent
into dangerous civil wars, or fitna. In particular, Surūr attributes the state of fitna not to
ʿulamāʾ who voice some criticism of the regime, but instead, to those ʿulamāʾ who
abandon correct legal jurisprudence and contradict past ruling in an effort to appease the
rulers. For instance, some of those ʿulamāʾ issued fatwas or legal opinions that
contradicted their previous opinions or the sharīʿa in fear of antagonizing the ruler. Surūr
also believed that the true source of al-fitna is not the critical or autonomous ʿulamāʾ, but
rather, those who shamefully issued fatwas legalizing repression against other ʿulamāʾ.243
It is required from the ʿulamāʾ, according to Surūr, not to bear arms against the rulers or
instigate the people against them, but to—at the bare minimum—issue clear legal
opinions against those rulers who do not properly apply the sharīʿa.244 He also denied the
claim of some ʿulamāʾ that the rulers in Saudi Arabia might deserve some special
dispensation—despite some errors and deviations— for being comparatively upright in
242
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comparison to the situation in neighboring countries. Such a relativist view, according to
Surūr, does not exempt scholars and preachers from the duty of denying wrong.245
Towards a New Reformism: Fiqh al-Waqiʿ and Ongoing Polemics
Building on resources found in the Islamic legal literature, the Ṣaḥwīs revived the
fiqh al-waqiʿ (jurisprudence /understanding of reality) and sought to use it as a tool to
enhance their domination in the Islamic sphere. According to some, advocating the fiqh
al-waqiʿ endowed the Ṣaḥwīs with superiority over the traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ, who
were seen as isolated from reality. On one hand, this expertise demonstrated that the
Ṣaḥwīs could fuse an extensive religious background with good knowledge of modern
sciences such as social sciences. However, the jurisprudence of reality also proved a
controversial topic engendering heated debate between the Surūrīs and the Jāmīs at the
beginning of the 1990s.
The fiqh al-waqiʿ is one of the key concepts in Islamic jurisprudence. The concept
was first coined by Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, a famous Ḥanbalī scholar and a student
of Ibn Taymiyya. In al-Jawziyya’s view, the mufti and the judge are required to
understand two points in order to issue a correct fatwa and verdicts. He wrote:
The first is having a grasp of reality. The faqīh should draw a conclusion of what
is happening based on evidence, indications, and signs so that he comprehends it.
The second is understanding of what is required with respect to reality, which
means understanding the ruling (judgment) of God and his Prophet that it is
established in His book or on the tongue of His Prophet in light of this reality.
After that, he should apply the one (matter) to the other.246
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Nāsịr al-ʿUmar, a key figure in the Ṣaḥwa movement who is often referred to as a leading
Surūrī, earned a doctorate from the college of the fundamentals of religion at Imam
Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in 1984, when he began teaching at the same
university. In his 1980s-era lectures, he invoked the concept of fiqh al-waqiʿ first
expounded by early Islamic scholars.247 Specifically, he talked about the importance of
this “ʿilm” and argued that “of the reasons of backwardness of the umma is its ignorance
of reality.”248 He defined the fiqh al-waqiʿ as “a science looking into understanding
contemporary circumstances, such as factors influencing/acting on societies,
forces/powers dominating states, ideas directed to undermine the faith, and the legitimate
ways of protecting the umma and making it advance now and in the future.”249 This ʿilm
requires that specialists learn not only the religious knowledge (ʿaqida and fiqh), but also
social sciences (history) and modern knowledge (politics and media).
Al-ʿUmar also emphasized that the practitioners of this type of fiqh should
continuously engage in the pursuit of learning by following new developments in the
sciences and news. 250 He clarified that those who analyze and evaluate contemporary
events must avoid biased negativity, but instead try to understand the reality in an
objective fashion.251 Furthermore, he encouraged those who want to specialize in fiqh alwaqiʿ to read historical studies and other scholarly works on politics, international
relations, and political economy, not to mention Muhammad Surūr’s Then Came the Turn
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Nāsịr al-ʿUmar, “Fiqh al-waqiʿ,” 11, http://almoslim.net/documents/Feqeh%20Alwaqei.pdf.
249
Ibid., 5.
250
Ibid., 15.
251
Ibid., 16.
247
248

87

of Majūs and Muhammad Qutḅ’s Our Contemporary Reality.252 He also highlighted
many of the positive outcomes of the fiqh al-waqiʿ, particularly as a tool to counteract the
enemies who might plot against the umma and the ʿulamāʾ. He explained that “the
secularists are plotting against the ʿulamāʾ of umma and seeking to distort their image
before the public by raising controversies in religious and scientific issues which might
seem a contradiction in the fatwa and weakness in ʿilm.” To avoid that, “the fatwa has to
be based on a conception of reality... which gives the fatwa respect and strength.”253
Unsurprisingly, the Jāmīs sought to belittle the importance of this notion of
grasping reality in the fiqh al-waqiʿ and accused its advocates of deviation from the right
Salafī path. Shaykh Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī claimed that the Ṣaḥwīs who advocated
the fiqh al-waqiʿ diverged from the teachings of great scholars such as Ibn al-Qayyim alJawziyya. He insisted that the Ṣaḥwīs revived the fiqh al-waqiʿ only for political purposes
against the Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ. He also believed that the Ṣaḥwīs’ focus on this type of fiqh
over other types of religious sciences is dangerous because it would distance the young
generation from religious studies and preoccupy them with politics. Furthermore, alMadkhalī sought to further demean the importance of awareness of the fiqh al-waqiʿ by
arguing that such knowledge it intended for a small group of people such as the rulers and
the ʿulamāʾ; the laymen, by contrast, have no need to understand this field. Often, alMadkhalī referred to those who advocate the fiqh al-waqiʿ pejoratively with the epithet of
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fuqahāʾ al-wāqiʿ (fuqahāʾ of reality) or al-mutaḥamisūn li fiqh al-waqiʿ (the enthusiasts
for the jurisprudence of reality).254
The core of the Jāmī argument against “the fiqh al-waqiʿ stemmed from the view
that such an emphasis represented a malicious plot against the religious sciences in
general, and the ʿulamāʾ of the umma in particular. The aim of the advocates of this fiqh
is elimination of the sharīʿa and an unacceptable alteration of the words of the Qurʾān
and Sunna.”255 Al-Madkhalī accused “the enthusiasts for the fiqh al-waqiʿ” of
exaggerating the importance of the fiqh al-waqiʿ and elevating other sciences over
sharīʿa. He proclaimed that in fact, fiqh al-waqiʿ should not be called either ʿilm or
fiqh.256 Furthermore, al-Madkhalī alleged that the fuqahāʾ al-wāqiʿ dangerously accused
the ʿulamāʾ of ignoring reality and not having enough knowledge of it.257 Finally, AlMadkhalī claimed that the fiqh al-waqiʿ exhibited dangerous political goals. This
approach, according to al- Madkhalī aims to cast aside the Salafī methodology and divide
the minds of youth from the Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ.258
Surūr, unsurprisingly, responded harshly in what would become an extended
cycle of polemics and bitter argumentation, seeking to maintain the Ṣaḥwīs’s gains by
refuting the Jāmīs’ attacks and defending the young Ṣaḥwīs scholars who revived the fiqh
al-waqiʿ and its stress on ʿilm. He also argued that the campaign of the loyalists against
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this school of fiqh amounted to little more than a defense of the Saudi royal family and an
attempt to justify its illegal activities and repression.
Surūr considered the fiqh al-waqiʿ a condition that must be met in the fatwa and
the mufti. He cited the saying of the Ahl al-Ḥadīth scholar Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn alAlbānī, who also commanded considerable respect among the Jāmīs,
Understanding reality to reach the sharʿī ruling is an important duty that a
specialized and smart group of seekers of knowledge have to do. This is just like
any other branch of knowledge, whether it has to do with sharīʿa, social sciences,
economics, military matters or any other branch of knowledge that is of benefit
the Islamic umma and will bring it back to its position of glory and leadership,
especially when these branches of knowledge are developing from one time and
place to another.259
Surūr asserted that all the ʿulamāʾ and seekers of religious knowledge, who are engaged
in the fiqh al-waqiʿ, “are known with authenticity in belief, the abundance of ʿilm, and
standing by the boundaries set by Allāh.” He denied al- Madkhalī’ accusation of
exaggeration in the importance of this fiqh. He also contended that the young ʿulamāʾ did
not exceed the lines drew by Ibn al-Qayyim and al-Albānī, adding that “these people (the
loyalists) know that who aims at overthrowing the sharīʿa is an infidel, so how can those,
who defend ʿulamāʾ, accuse other ʿulamāʾ of committing infidelity and apostasy, even
though the methodology is the same and the belief is the same?!”260 Surūr rejected the
claim of the loyalists that fiqh al- waqiʿ is a conspiracy against the sharīʿa.
Finally, the arguments on behalf of fiqh al-waqiʿ culminated with his claim that
this methodology represented not only the correct sharʿī, but that it amounts to a farḍ
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kifāya (a communal obligation), rather than a farḍ ʿayn (an Individual obligation). In
another words, if some of the scholars undertake it, the obligation is waived for the
other.261 Surūr discussed al-Madkhalī’s castigation of the sources used in this type of fiqh
as unreliable. Surūr argued that people who are specialized in ʿilm must acquire extensive
religious knowledge, examine the news that they obtain, and explain and publish the
sources upon which they rely.262 Surūr gave an example in which he intended not only to
explain his idea and refute al-Madkhalī’s critique, but also to criticize the Saudi regime.
He stated that “if the news recurs from the kuffār about an official visit of American
officials to Riyāḍ, and then held a series of meetings with their Saudi counterparts that
resulted in an agreement (that) what the media of walī al-amr has kept silent from
publicity - as usual - and published in details by American media outlets and discussed
and endorsed it by the Congress, would we deny this news because the infidels were only
people circulated it.”263 Despite the effort of al-Madkhalī to undermine the bases of this
knowledge, Surūr, with his example, wanted to refute al-Madkhalī’s claims and take the
debate back to its core underlying issue: namely the Saudi Arabian relationship with the
United States and the West in general.
Debate about Tawḥīd al-Ḥākimiyya
These debates over the proper place of loyalty to the Saudi state for Muslim
scholars also spilled over into other arenas of intra-Salafi theological polemics, including
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the concept of tawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya. In particular, the debates about the authenticity and
legitimacy increased within Salafī circles at the start of the 1990s. Before we go further in
examining this debate about the authenticity and legitimacy of the tawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya, it
is essential to explain the meaning and connotations of this concept. Al-ḥākimiyya (the
sovereignty of God) means that the sovereignty belongs only to God and He is the One in
whom is vested the right of legislation, judging and executing the judgments. Abū l-Aʿlā
Mawdūdī (1903–79), the Indo-Pakistani scholar, introduced the concept of al-ḥākimiyya
in the twentieth century to modern Islamist discourse. Influenced by Mawdūdī’s works,
Sayyid Qutḅ also picked up the term and popularized it across the Middle East as
discussed in chapter 1.
Joined to the concept of al-ḥākimiyya, in turn, was the idea of tawḥīd, the unitary
oneness of God—a universally acknowledged—core component of Islam and the most
critical aspect in Salafism and Wahhabism. In order to achieve an accurate understanding
of the concept and to prevent their Muslim followers from stumbling into unsanctioned
“innovation,” the Salafī Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ broke down the concept of tawḥīd into
categories. Perhaps the earliest figure associated with Wahhabism, the Saudi Shaykh,
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (l. 1703-1792), divided it into three constituent
components: tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya (Oneness of Lordship), tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya (Oneness of
divinity), and tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa al-ṣifāt (Oneness of names, qualities, and attributes).
These classifications are for the most part accepted among Wahhābīs. However, it is
important to note that these categories are not present in the Quran and Sunnah but were
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developed by Wahhābī scholars to facilitate the understanding of texts and rulings of
sharīʿa.264
Meanwhile, political events and other perceived social changes encouraged
Ṣaḥwīs to combine the concept of al-ḥākimiyya with concept of ṭawḥīd. The muchdiscussed intervention of American troop in the Arabian Peninsula increased the fears of
the Ṣaḥwīs about being dominated by the encroaching colonial powers. The Ṣaḥwīs also
began to combat the secular influence that appeared at that time in the Kingdom and
called for separation between religion and state.265 As a reaction to these calls, the Ṣaḥwīs
pioneered the fusion of the concept of al-ḥākimiyya with the concept of ṭawḥīd, forming a
new category of ṭawḥīd, known as ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya to educate Muslims about the
importance of the oneness of God’s rule.
However, linking the idea of God’s sovereignty with ṭawḥīd elicited the
opposition of Jāmīs who believed that creating a new category of ṭawḥīd constituted an
act of bidʿa and an unnecessary addition. The main concerns of the Jāmīs were that the
Ṣaḥwīs did not show full commitment to practicing ṭawḥīd, and their emphasis on alḥākimiyya and ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya simply emanated from malign political purposes. In
his writing, Al-Madkhalī referred to the Ṣaḥwīs who call and promote ṭawḥīd alḥākimiyya as “people of politicians” who have political agendas.
Al-Madkhalī criticized Islamist groups who preoccupied themselves with politics,
the call for al-ḥākimiyya and the establishment of the Islamic state. Al-Madkhalī did not
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neglect al-ḥākimiyya and argued that “the call for al-ḥākimiyya and its implementation
are the important thing… in case its conditions were observed.”266 However, as for the
ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya, al-Madkhalī rejected making a fourth category of ṭawḥīd. For him,
it represented yet another act of unlawful innovation and a political plot by politically
oriented Islamist rivals to achieve al-ḥākimiyya and establish their vision of an Islamic
state. He also believed that the division of ḥākimiyya into a separate classification of
ṭawḥīd represents a distortion of the true meaning of ṭawḥīd.267
Surūr vociferously responded to these Jāmīs’ arguments yet again by invoking a
common refrain: the idea that loyalists “entered the battle in response to the order of walī
ul-amr.”268 Surūr argued that the Jāmīs “appointed themselves as attorneys on behalf of
their wūlāt omūrihm (rulers)” to justify their failures in full implementation of sharīʿa.269
The exiled religious scholar specifically argued that “the talk about the ṭawḥīd alḥākimiyya for the loyalists has become like a political act, can do nothing but harm,
because it leads inevitably to clash with the regimes.”270 In his view, it is a religious duty
upon Muslims to propagate the call for the ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya and seek to achieve full
implementation of Allah’s laws.
Surūr also defended ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya as a valid classification of ṭawḥīd and
opposed the accusation that it constituted an innovation. He stressed its importance by
citing the works of a range of classical and contemporary Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ including
Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, Manhaj al-ʾAnbiyāʾ fi al-Daʿwa ila Allāh fihi al-Ḥikmah wa al-ʿaql (The
Methodology of the Prophets in Calling to God) second edition 1993, 181.
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Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb himself. Surūr noted that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb
considered “those who believe that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allāh be upon
him) did not complete his guidance or that the rule (judgment) of the others is better than
his rule (judgment), as those who prefer the ruling of ṭāghūt (tyrant) on his rule are kafirs
(infidels).”271 He also asked whether the loyalists have read the work of Shaykh
Muḥammad Amīn al-Shanqīṭī, who saw “the one who follows an order other than God’s
law and legislation is like worshiping an idol and worshiping idolatry, and there is no
difference between them in any way, they are one, both are idolaters.”272 For Surūr, the
Jāmī position on ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya just represented one more example of their total
subordination to the Saudi rulers despite their violation of Islamic decrees.
Surūr continued his refutation of the Jāmīs and accused them of espionage, not to
mention writing false reports to slander the Ṣaḥwa and the Ṣaḥwīs. According to Surūr,
al-Madkhalī erroneously linked fiqh al-waqiʿ (jurisprudence of reality) and ḥākimiyya
with rebellion against the rulers in his writings. In order to prove his claim, al-Madkhalī
mentioned the names of the Ṣaḥwa preachers and misquoted their sayings. Then, he
analyzed these quotations and heavily imputed meanings that distorted the actual words.
Al-Madkhalī also called these chosen examples from sayings and writings of the Ṣaḥwīs
“foretastes of rebellion.” Finally, he warned the ruler “to be aware of those Khawārij
(Kharijites) and strike them with an iron fist.”273
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Surūr concluded that the dispute between the Jāmīs or “the ḥizb -wūlat” (party of
loyalists) and what he called the centrist preachers of the Free Salafīs, otherwise known
as the Ṣaḥwīs, did not fundamentally hinge on religious matters such as the position
regarding the innovators or the way of commanding good and forbidding wrong. Instead,
he observed that the loyalists “entered this battle in response to the orders issued by the
rulers, who handed over the reins of affairs in the Arabian Peninsula to American
polytheistic and their allies.” He added that the loyalists “will not be pleased unless the
rulers are pleased, and the rulers will not be pleased unless the Americans are pleased.”274
For Surūr, the Jāmīs amounted to little more than a tool in the service of political rulers.
By 1994, the Jāmīs appeared victorious after jailing the key figures of the Ṣaḥwa
such as Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān al-ʿAwda. With the backing of the Saudi government
and adoption of the popular Ahl al-Ḥadīth trend, the Jāmīs became an essential player in
the Islamic circle in Saudi Arabia and contributed to weakening the authority of the
Ṣaḥwa by drawing some followers. The conflict impacted the Jāmīs themselves by
changing the very nature of the group. A group that first appeared as a daʿwa group
calling for refraining from politics transformed into an organization dedicated to
criticizing other Islamist movements. In the highly polarized moment of the Gulf War,
the group began to take more a ḥarakī character by embracing the tools of a political
party, like attracting followers and having leadership and goals. In general, it is noted that
this conflict resulted in the weakening of the Ṣaḥwa phenomenon, at the expense of the
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growth of other trends. The liberal orientation and other religious trends, like the people
of jurisprudence, made their way to the scene again.275
Examining the debates among non-violent Salafīs reveals the dynamics of the
Salafi scene in Saudi Arabia in the late twentieth century. The Ṣaḥwīs invoked and
reformulated concepts in their pursuit to find tools to help them in their religious
reformist project, which emphasized maintaining the importance of sharīʿa and
incorporating modern sciences with religious knowledge. However, the Jāmīs, who
adopted a purist Salafī approach, sought to demean this discourse by linking it with the
revolutionary discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood, highlighting the limits of these
concepts, and questioning their consistency with Salafī methodology.
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Chapter 5
Surūr’s Rejection of Violence and Extremism
Activist (ḥarakī) Salafīs from different schools belong to the same overarching
ideological and creedal Islamic school of thought and pursue overlapping goals. Despite
such broad similarities, these activists engaged in vigorous debates and intellectual
conflicts over the emergence of elements that we might call “extremist,” who embraced
divergent methods and tactics in their pursuit of broadly shared goals against the larger
backdrop of turbulent politics in the Islamic world of the late twentieth century. Two
prominent examples of such extremist discourses that proved especially divisive within
the Salafī movement include the idea of “takfir,” or declaring a Muslim to be a kāfir [an
unbeliever] because of an aspect of their belief or actions, and the embrace of violence as
a tactic. In this chapter, I will examine how such beliefs polarized Salafīs into non-violent
and violent political factions, this time pitting the “centrist” Surūrīs not against the Saudi
state or “Jamī Salafī loyalists,” but against more radical forces within Salafism.
From the outset of his career, Surūr adopted a non-violent approach to Islamist
politics that would soon inform his denunciation of the wholesale declarations of takfīr
employed by certain Salafi Muslims against co-religionists who do not share their
doctrines or interpretation of the sources of Islam. Surūr expressed particularly harsh
criticism of those Muslims who deployed violence as a tool for implementing sharīʿa,
denouncing in no uncertain terms any indiscriminate attacks made by Muslims against
fellow Muslims. He described the extremists as ignorant of Islamic precepts and
specifically condemned their advocacy of takfīr and violence as a form of unacceptable
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bidʿ (innovations.) Surūr argued that their lack of religious knowledge impaired their
ability and eligibility for giving legal rulings or opinion. Although they draw from the
Qurʾān and other foundational sources of Islam, Surūr contended, they selectively choose
verses and evidence in a way that agree with their bidʿ (innovations) of takfīr and spilling
Muslim blood. Diving into history, Surūr blamed the phenomenon of takfīr that emerged
in the late of the 1960s and the early 1970s on the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood
by various Arab regimes and the mistreatment of members of other Islamist groups in
Arab prisons.276 Thus, repressive regimes bore a large measure of the blame for providing
fertile ground for the emergence of radicalism, according to Surūr. However, while this
scholar mostly blamed unjust regimes, he also took to task the practitioners of such
wayward takfīrī doctrines, attributing their errors to the lack of religious knowledge
among their leaders and adaptation of extreme ideas in their religious interpretations of
takfīr from Khawārij (Kharijites). This chapter sheds light on Surūr’s position toward
extremist groups and their ideology and demonstrates the main differences between nonviolent and violent political Salafīs.
Surūr embraced a decisive position against what he called “al-Ghulāt” (the
exaggerators/ extremists/ radicals), and he specifically provided a detailed refutation of
the ideology of two such organizations, al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and
Exodus/Emigration) led by Shukri Muṣṭafā in Egypt and the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA), an Islamist group which gained notoriety for using mass violence during the
Algerian Civil War. He argued in his writings about the incompatibility of such extremist
Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, al-Ḥukum Bighar Ma Anzal Allāh wa ahl al-ghulū: Jamāʿa alMuslimīn (Ruling by what God has not revealed and the People of Extremism) (London: Dar al-Jabiyya,
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ideologies with the creed of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jamāʻa (the Sunnis; lit. people of the
tradition of the Prophet and community). Given Surūr’s reputation as a leading exponent
of Salafism, his condemnation and refutation of the doctrines of al-Ghulāt posed a
profound threat to these groups, who also claimed to adhere to the same Salafī creedal
school. Indeed, Surūr was one of the first political Islamists who warned of the
phenomena of extremism and takfīr among the Muslim groups in Egypt and Algeria in
several books and articles, perhaps prefiguring criticism of groups like ISIL in the 21st
century. In 1986, even before the emergence of Al-Qaʻida or the War on Terror, Surūr
penned the book al-Ḥukum Bighīr Ma Anzal Allāh wa ahl al-Ghulw (Ruling by what God
has not revealed and the People of Extremism), in which he examined the origins of the
Shukri Muṣṭafā group’s extremist ideology and demonstrated its deviations from the
manhaj of ahl al-sunna wa al-jamāʻa. Surūr also argued that in modern times, takfīr
doctrine and extremism did not exist before this group.277
In his 1986 book, Surūr noted that the doctrine of takfīr first appeared in the
second half of the twentieth century inside the infamous Egyptian prisons when
thousands Muslim Brotherhood member confronted ruthless repression by the Egyptian
government. He demonstrated that a small group of the imprisoned activists led by the
Azahri shaykh, Ali Abdo Ismail, who formulated its religious foundations, began to adopt
extremist ideas such as takfīr in the 1960s.278 The most prominent manifestations of these
ideas are declaring takfīr on the Egyptian regime under the leadership of Gamal Abdel
Nasser. Then, they extended such charges of apostasy to Egyptian society writ large,
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noting that ordinary people supported the ruler and did not rebel against the regime.279
These radicalized prisoners, in turn, developed the belief that a person cannot be a
genuine Muslim unless he joined their group “Jamāʿa al-Muslimīn” (the Society of
Muslims); all outsiders, by contrast, were infidels.280
Surūr explained that these prisoners derived aspects of their new ideology from
the texts and conceptions of the Khawārij (Kharijites).281 Eventually, Shaykh Ali Abdo
Ismail later renounced this idea of takfīr entirely, but his erstwhile followers reorganized
around a young, charismatic agricultural engineer student, Shukri Muṣṭafā, who was
imprisoned from 1965 to 1971 because of his activism in the Muslim Brotherhood. After
his release from prison in the beginning of the 1970s, he found Jamāʿa al-Muslimīn.282
The group was crushed by Egyptian security forces and Mustafa was executed in 1977
after the group assassinated Muhammad Hussein al-Dhahbi, an Islamic scholar who was
the former Minister of Islamic Endowments and a vocal critic of the Jamāʿa al-Muslimīn
group.
The group is often popularly referred to as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra, or
“Excommunication and Exodus/Emigration,” a derogatory term used by the Egyptian
media after its confrontation with the government.283 In the 1970s, leaders of the group
believed that jihād was not possible at that time. Thus, they urged their followers and true
Muslims to denounce the kāfir (non-Muslim infidel) nature of Egyptian society, to isolate
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themselves from it and to perform hijra (emigration) to establish an authentic society
through education (tarbiyya). Then, once they built their strength, they could come back
to conquer and re-Islamize the Egyptian nation.284
It is notable that Surūr, himself an active promoter of the teachings and writings
of Sayyid Qutḅ, would deny that Qutḅ’s ideas were compatible with the takfīr doctrinal
ideology of this group and its leaders.285 Yet, despite such denials, Shukri Muṣṭafā was
influenced by Qutḅ’s doctrines of Hijra, al-Jāhiliyya and al-ḥākkimyya, but embraced the
most extreme interpretation possible by declaring all of society takfīr.286 Surūr also
observed that the extremist ideology of the Shukri group derived much of its content from
the ideology of the Khawārij, especially the issue of takfīr. For Surūr, the propagation of
a doctrine of takfīr constituted the key source of bid’a and deviation, particularly in the
way it justified bloodshed against other Muslims and the usurpation of their wealth.287
In his writings, Surūr reviewed doctrines of the group and discussed the religious
errors of its theological structure. Surūr pointed out that Shukri Muṣṭafā’s conceptions,
forged within prison, violated the principles of Islam and the methodology of Ahl alSunna wa al-Jamaa in several specific ways. First, he criticized the group’s rejection of
taqlīd (imitation of four Sunni canonical legal schools (madhahib). As we mentioned
before that most of the Salafis promote ijtihad and reject taqlīd. However, they are
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different on the degree of following or rejection of existing jurisprudence. For followers
of Shukri Muṣṭafā, taqlīd functioned as the source of polytheism because it promotes
blind subservience to Islamic scholars. According to Mustafa, the source of this error
derived from the fact that the masses accepted the judgments of the muqallid (who
performs taqlīd) without asking about the dalīl (proof). Instead, Shukri Muṣṭafā argued, it
is obligatory for each Muslim to perform individual ijtihād. Consequently, his followers
believed that each Muslim should be a mujtahid, and the one who performs taqlīd is
kafir.288
The competing interpretations regarding taqlīd among different schools of
Muslims are extensive and cut in many different political directions. In the 19th and 20th
centuries, Muslim reformists such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and
Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, who sought to respond to the Western cultural and political
threat but at the same use the West as a model for imitation, opposed the principle of
taqlīd. These reformers regarded taqlīd as a source of cultural and intellectual stagnation
for Muslims. Instead, they encouraged ijtihād that gives more room for independent
reasoning and depends less on the traditional schools of law and the mystical orders.289
Most modern Salafīs are agreed, in broad principle, on the importance of ijtihād
reasoning and the rejection of the taqlīd of the four Sunni schools. However, they
diverged on the full extent to which they should reject or follow the opinions of these
schools. Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Albānī, a major influencer on the modern Salafī
288

Ibid., 33-38.
Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,1983), 127, 140-141, 150.
289

103

movement, rejected taqlīd, condemned it as a reprehensible innovation, and insisted that
the Muslim can acquire the religious knowledge easily.290
In accordance with his radical Salafi centrism, Surūr admitted the reprehensible
nature of taqlīd as practiced by the bāṭinīs, or those who focus on an inner, esoteric
(bāṭin) meaning in the interpretation of religious texts, as well as other ṣūfī exaggerators
and the Khawārij. In Surūr’s estimation, throughout the history of Muslim community,
these groups had all left a lasting legacy of terrible consequences. Surūr blamed the
“deviated groups” for improper use of taqlīd, which led Muslims to the unthinking
acceptance of the views of the leaders of their school of thought, who were in turn treated
with great veneration by their followers. He also noted that Muslims had turned away
from the Qurʾān and Sunnah to dedicate themselves to the study of the books and letters
of their shaykhs; ultimately, Surūr believed these books functioned as barriers between
Muslim believers and the key scriptural texts that constituted the only true way to learn
the Islamic sciences.
While Surūr stressed the importance of Muslims seeking religious knowledge,
however, he also asserted the permissibility of taqlīd for ordinary people who had not
immersed themselves in a life of religious scholarship. He believed that if ordinary
people attempted to perform ijtihād, they would not have time to do anything other than
acquiring religious knowledge, thereby hobbling trade, crafts, and agriculture in the
Islamic community.291 Surūr added that even some of Ṣaḥāba (companions) did not reach
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the degree of ijtihād required to practice taqlīd.292 At the same time, he stressed that
permissibility of taqlīd should not be equated with the end of Muslims seeking their own
path to religious knowledge or expressing blind loyalty to the opinions and fatwas of a
scholar.293 In sum, he took a middle path that preserved taqlīd while conferring more
responsibility to the individual believer—consistent with his radical Salafi centrism.
Furthermore, Surūr argued that followers of Shukri Muṣṭafā discarded ijmāʿ, or
the concept of consensus of Islamic scholars, a practice regarded by Sunni Muslims to be
the primary principle of Islamic law (sharīʿa). Surūr particularly lamented that such
radicals did not stop at condemning those who see the ijmāʿ as a legitimate proof, but
went so far as to declare takfīr (excommunication) against them.294 Surūr defined ijmāʿ as
a consensus of the mujtahidūn (pl. mujtahid, the learned scholar) on a particular legal
ruling and affirmed it is impossible for the mujtahidūn of the people of the Sunna to reach
total agreement on an issue that does not have proof from the Sunna of the Prophet.295
Yet, Surūr argued that ijmāʿ does not comprise the abstract words or opinions of men, as
Shukri claimed, but rather, the considered judgment of scholars based on legitimate
evidentiary text.296 He listed a series of verses from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth as a basis of
this principle’s legitimacy.297 Surūr added “all that the Shukri’s group wrote in criticizing
the ijmāʿ is not at all new.” They derived their thoughts from the people of rāfiḍa (the
rejectionists) and al-muʿtazilah without citing the sources they used.298
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The quickness of Shukri and his group to declare takfīr on fellow Muslims who
commit major sins is one of the main criticisms of Surūr against the ideology of Shukri’s
group. For instance, according to Surūr, Shukri and his followers pronounced various
Muslims who commit major sins, such as shirk (associating partners with Allāh) or
committing murder and adultery even if they pray and fast on Ramadan, as kufār.299 From
this point of view, they excommunicated some of the prophets and messengers such as
Adam and Ibrahim, because they committed sins.300 Shukri’s group, according to Surūr,
relied on generalities, logical fallacies, inaccuracies and distortion of the word to justify
their positions.301 Surūr argued that declaring takfīr against the sinners is a bid’a
(innovation) and that the Sunni position does not consider Muslims disbelievers because
of their sins.
Surūr also criticized Shukri and his followers for their claims that they alone
represent true Islam and that their leader (Shukri) is the al-mahdī (messiah); indeed,
members of this group went so far as to believe that the Egyptian authorities could not
kill Shukri, and that he would never die.302 He condemned the group’s “call for illiteracy”
and their misinterpretation of the texts. Surūr accused Shukri’s followers of believing that
learning writing, and reading are forbidden, thereby condemning the Islamic umma to
illiteracy, and they believe that the Muslims should instead direct their effort and time to
learn only religious sciences. For example, since Shukri invoked the Ḥadīth which says,
“we are an illiterate nation; we neither write, nor know accounts,” his followers
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concluded that the Muslims should be Ummiyūm (illiterates).303 Surūr discussed this
point, citing the interpretation that says the word Ummiyūm in this Ḥadīth refers to the
Arabs before Islam who were generally illiterate by comparison to later “people of the
books.”304
With the eruption of the Algerian Civil War and the rise of radical groups that
fought jihād against the Algerian government in the 1990s, Surūr published in his alSunnah magazine a series of articles criticizing the extremists, particularly their
methodology, violent approach, and lack of religious knowledge. It is important here to
note that Surūr did not, therefore, offer a more “moderate” approach, at least in a political
sense, simply because of his rejection of takfīr and violence—rather, his stance
comprised something more akin to what I describe here as “radical Salafi centrism.” He
still rejected electoral processes as a legitimate means to establish the Islamic state. He
believed that the parliamentary elections were not only a waste of time, but because they
originated from secular societies, stood in conflict with Islamic principles; he also
believed that Islamists who participated in the elections did not achieve the electoral
promises they made despite their many concessions. Instead, like other Salafīs, Surūr
stressed the importance of military jihād in a general sense and saw its great virtue.
At the same time, Surūr rejected the violence that was used by some of the
Algerian Islamists such as the Armed Islamic group (GIA) to achieve their goal in
establishing an Islamic state.305 In addition to his polemics against Shukri’s group, Surūr
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provided refutations of a number of issues raised by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
The GIA was one of the insurgent groups that fought the Algerian regime between 1992 2002. It emerged when Algeria’s military government decided to annul the 1992 election
in which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the moderate Islamic political party, appeared
to be winning the elections democratically. In its pursuit of establishing an explicitly
Islamic state, the GIA waged a total war against the military government in Algeria. The
group launched a campaign of violence, targeting not only the government and the
military but also civilians, journalists, and foreign subjects. It also conducted a campaign
against other Islamists who left the group or did not agree with the GIA.306
Surūr began by criticizing the group for practicing killing and other brutal actions
under the guise of jihād. In particular, he stated that the Ḥizb al-Ghūlāt raises the banner
of jihād, but the content is different from the slogan.307 He added that they commit the
most heinous crimes and the ugliest acts in the name of jihād and abuse this duty, giving
people a distorted image of it.308 Surūr pointed out that the main characteristic of GIA is
the legalization of the bloodshed of dissenters. He recognized the acceleration of the
incidences of violence committed by that group, which increasingly assumed a
destructive and indiscriminate character. Such incidences did not leave any segment of
Algerian society unaffected. For instance, Surūr reported directly on conditions in
Algeria, noting that “public roads have become unsafe because of shifting checkpoints
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where they check passengers’ IDs. At which point they kill those they identified as
members of military and those who did not comply with orders issued by the leadership
of this party.”309 They blow up markets, under the pretext of killing a patrol of security
men and they do not care if they victimize women, children, and the elderly.310 He added
that the extremists in Algeria did not only justify killing members of the military and
innocent civilians, but also issued a statement legalizing bloodshed of preachers and other
Islamist groups leaders.311 In the end, he wondered what al-Ghūlāt would do to their
fellow Muslims if they actually imposed their rule over Algeria and how many giant
factories they were going to open for the manufacture of knives, daggers, and swords.312
Ultimately, Surūr continued, as a scholar, refuting and addressing mistakes of
extremists, specifically rejecting their religious rulings and opinions that justify the
spilling of Muslim blood. Surūr argued that they are not qualified to issue fatwas because
they lack ʿilm and the necessary learning requirements to issue fatwas. They selectively
choose from religious sources to meet their desire without looking at the entirety of the
Qurʾānic text and Ḥadīths that related to such matters. Such deviators from correct
practice, according to Surūr, often involved the citation of a Qurʾānic verse or a Ḥadīth or
sayings from the Salaf to derive a legal opinion or a ruling without any understanding of
their true meaning and full context.
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To buttress his contention that members of the GIA did not comprise legitimate
religious scholars, Surūr mentioned five qualifications for a muftī and applied them to the
extremists who issued fatwa in the most serious and legal (sharʿī) issues. Surūr argued
that the extremists are ineligible to practice fatwa for many reasons. First, they “have
busied themselves with the issues of apostasy and Khurūj (rebellion) and they do not
have time for the study of the sciences of the Qurʾān and delving deeper into the sciences
of Ḥadīth and fiqh.” They refuse to study at the hands of the distinguished ʿulamāʾ
because, according to the extremists, they are hypocrites and scholars of authority.313
Surūr suggested some characteristics that should be present in the muftī, which are
“patience, serenity and reverence.” However, he described the extremists as “careless,
hastiness, fury, and irascibility and their positions are volatile.” They will not be able to
achieve neutrality and impartiality in their judgment.314 One of the most important
conditions for a person who practices the fatwa is to have ʿilm (knowledge). This
attribute is not present for anyone of the extremists, and none of them deserves to be
called anʿālim (scholar). On the contrary, Surūr called them ignorant.315
Another reason for the extremists in Algeria being disqualified from giving
religious rulings is that they are people of innovation and desire. Rebellion (Khurūj)
against the rulers is the main focus of the Ḥizb al-Ghūlāt’s activism and the basis upon
which they determined their attitude towards others.316 Thus, the fatwa of advocates of
this bidʿa is not acceptable because they are going to give a religious verdict in
313
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accordance with their purpose and desire. They are going to choose the evidence with
which they agree.317
One contradiction that they fall in is that they speak in the name of the Salaf and
believe that they are the only ones who understand and quote their sayings. Surūr
admitted that all their fatwas include evidence from the Qur'an, Sunnah and the sayings
of the Salaf. However, the problem, according to Surūr, is that they incorrectly
characterize this evidence to support conclusions that amount to bidʿa directly
contradicting what the evidence actually means.318 Surūr argued that it is not enough to
gather relevant scriptural passages and insert them in a fatwa or a legal opinion. The muftī
should comprehend and consider everything about the evidence before the quotation,
such as their contexts and meanings.
Surūr also noted that the issue of jihād al-ṭawāghīt (unjust tyrants) is the most
important element in the methodology of these extremists. It is this concept, according to
Surūr, that provided extremists with criteria to judge others and whoever disagrees with
them as a misguided innovator.319 The al-Ghūlāt do not believe in seeking knowledge
and education as a way to reform and establish the desired Islamic state. On the contrary,
they think that all regimes in the Islamic world are infidel and apostate and that the best
way to achieve these goals is to declare jihād and fight these governments. They believe
that the fight against these regimes is an individual duty on every Muslim. The Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) began killing ʿulamāʾ and preachers who do not support their
317
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opinion of fighting the regime and then issued a statement that declared that it is not
permissible to have more than one group to fight jihād against the Algerian government.
It also declared that the GIA is the only legitimate jihādī group in Algeria. After this
statement, the GIA added new targets to its list and conducted a violent campaign against
other Islamists, such as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), who fought to reestablish an
electoral process that had been annulled by a military coup in 1992.320 In the end, Surūr
wondered if the extremists are aiming to establish an Islamic state with the strategy of
gaining the enmity of the people. He stated that they declared wars on everyone at the
same time and failed to distinguish between friend and foe.321
Rebellion and fighting against the apostate regimes of the Muslim world are the
core of the extremist ideology and the breakpoints between them and other groups. Any
group that does not agree with these two principles automatically becomes an enemy for
these extremists.322 Surūr gave his opinion regarding the rebellion against the “sinful
unjust rulers.” He tended to the traditional view that says that it is not permissible to rebel
and remove the “unjust ruler” if rebellion would result in greater disorder and leads to
corruption, oppression, and bloodshed.323 It is important to remember that Surūr’s
position about Saudi rulers did not exceed these lines. On one hand, he did not call for
violent rebellion against the Saudi rulers. On the other, he believed that it is an obligation
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to denounce the Saudi rulers in public when they contradict the sharīʿa. Surūr believed
that rebellion against the “apostate ruler” who he ordered something contrary to the
sharīʿa may be permissible under certain conditions. First, Muslims should provide
advice to the ruler to curb his orders. Then, they should have “the capability” to remove
the ruler without causing harm that is worse than that caused by the ruler in the first
place.324 Additionally, the insurgent group must have a form of leadership with the
qualifications of the ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd (the people of loosening and binding) to
reduce any possibility of lawlessness.325
In conclusion, with the rise of the extremist tendencies, that promoted violence
and adopted radical positions toward other Muslims, in the second half of the twentieth
century, it was imperative for Surūr to present his views about these groups and refute
their ideology. He rejected the campaign of violence and declared that because extremists
do not have religious knowledge and their understanding for the Islamic sources is
shallow, their fatwas do not have value. He accused them of bidʿ and following their
desires, addressing the mistakes and warning them that what they are doing is clearly
wrong. Surūr sought to refute their theology of justifying violence against those guilty of
deviations and mistakes or religious error. He also criticized their perception of jihād
asserting that it is not jihād at all, but it is bloodshed and criminality.
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Despite the substantial differences between Surūr’s ideology and the extremists’
ideology, a few articles that appeared after his death argued that Surūr was responsible in
one way or another for the rise in extremist movements, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the contemporary Middle East. These articles argue
that Surūr was the key figure who played the main role of transform of the traditional
quietist Salafism to Salafi jihadism by introducing the revolutionary ideas of political
Islam to it. These articles claim that Western and Arab scholars misconceived Surūr’s
legacy; instead, they argue that he was a man who shares blame for the normalization and
the prevalence of religious extremism and even set the intellectual foundations for the
current trend of the Salafist-jihadist violence in the Middle East.326 Hussein Ibish, a
senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, argues that Abu
Muḥammad Al-Maqdisī, a Jordanian-Palestinian leading Salafī jihadī ideologue, was
influenced in his teenage years in Kuwait by Surūr. He adds that although al-Maqdisi
criticized Surūr for his lenient position toward the Arab regimes, he still provides a good
example of this point of view.327
In his remarkable book A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu
Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, Joas Wagemakers admits Surūr’s influence on al-Maqdisī, who
later rejected his teachings.328 He argues that al-Maqdisī in his journey found that the
purist Wahhābī religious tradition is the only one conferred the most authentic Salafi
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nature and the tools by which he can excommunicate the political rulers. Wagemakers
adds that Al-Maqdisī was strongly influenced by Juhayman’s supporters and their
practice of radical concept al-walaʾ waʾ l-baraʾ (loyalty and disavowal). Al-Maqdisī
developed the concept and took to its extreme political end by declaring takfīr against the
regimes in the Muslim world for adopting to non-Islamic laws and the Saudi state
because of its relations with the United States and the West. Hence, jihād would be an
adequate form of disavowal and wholly based on Wahhābī reasoning.329
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
After the death of the two most prestigious official Wahhabi scholars, Muftī Bin
Bāz and Muḥammad Ibn ʿUthaymīn, the Sahwī ʿulamāʾ who were released from prison
in 1999 became major religious actors in the Kingdom. According to Saʿd al-Faqīh, after
their release, they decided to continue their daʿwa activism and refrain from political
activities. They even played a role in countering the ideology of extremist groups, such as
al-Qaʿida. After the reconciliation between the Surūrīs and regime, Surūr decided to tone
down his criticism against the Saudi regime. According to Saʿd al-Faqīh, Surūr believed
that the priority is to face the threats of Iran and the extremist groups. He visited the
Kingdom many times to perform ʿUmra (visiting the holy sites in Mecca and Medina
beyond the obligation of Hajj).330
With the eruption of the Syrian uprising in 2011, Surūr declared his support for
the revolution against the Baath regime from his last station in Qatar. He contributed to
the establishment of many organizations such as the Syrian Islamic Council. 331 Surūr’s
primary effort was his role in unifying different non-jihadist Islamist rebel brigades in the
Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, one of the strongest armed coalitions in Syria at that
time opposing Assad regime.332 The Syrian National Council, the most prominent
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opposition’s political body, gave condolences upon Surūr’s death in 2016, memorializing
as “a great symbol of moderation.”333
Before he died, Surūr, in a video statement, also declared his support to Operation
Decisive Storm, a military intervention launched by Saudi Arabia in 2015 that attacked
the Houthi militia, an Iranian proxy in Yemen. In the broadcasted video on Al Jazeera
Mubasher, Surūr stated that the long-waited operation would curb Iran’s covetousness in
the region. He also praised the rulers of Saudi Arabia and described them as heroes.334
Surūr’s burial in November 2016 was attended by thousands of people both
within and outside of Qatar. The previous Amir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad b. Thani and the
political leader of Hamas, Khālid Mashʿal, along with many scholars and Islamic
preachers, were among the senior figures to attend his funeral. The current Amir of Qatar,
Shaykh Tamim b. Hamad and even Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Qatar visited the
house of the Sheikh in Qatar to offer their condolences to his family and children.335 The
key figures in the Sahwa posted their obituaries on social media, memorializing his good
deeds.336
This thesis sheds light on the thought of Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr, one of the
early influencers of the Ṣaḥwa movement, and offers a close view of his synthesis, which
is an amalgam of the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood and religious ideas of
333
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Wahhābīs. Furthermore, it shows the diversity of the Salafiyya movement by analyzing
the relationship of the Salafī groups toward politics and violence. Through analyzing the
intra-Salafī debates, the study contributes to the discussion on Salafism by examining the
doctrinal differences between various groups.
As we have seen, the influx of members of the Muslim Brotherhood from various
Arab countries to Saudi Arabia between the 1950s and 1970s played an essential role in
the emergence of the Ṣaḥwa movement. One member of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
Syrian ideologue Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr, influenced the Ṣaḥwa and infused a ḥarakī
orientation into purist and non-political Wahhābī circles. The political awareness of
Muḥammad Surūr was shaped early in the ranks of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,
where he learned the significance of organization and planning. Fleeing from the
repression of the Baʿth regime, Surūr moved to Saudi Arabia in 1965 to work as a teacher
in Scientific Institutes in the Kingdom. In Saudi Arabia, he began to be influenced by the
doctrinal thought of the Salafī Wahhābī school.
Surūr’s adoption of Salafiyya had a profound impact on the rest of his life. On the
one hand, it facilitated his entry to the Saudi religious circles and introduced his ideas that
played a significant role in formulating the Ṣaḥwa movement. On the other hand, his new
convictions caused tensions with his previous Muslim Brotherhood compatriots.
Although he decided to turn away from the Muslim Brotherhood and criticize it, he still
bore the traces of Muslim Brotherhood influence to a significant extent. By the late
1960s, he created a new formula which combined aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood
with the Salafī teachings. Under the influence of Surūr’s ideas, a new group known as the

118

al-Surūriyya the main group known as the within the Ṣaḥwa movement, appeared which
had a significant impact on Saudi Islamic activism.
Surūr is also known for his anti-Shīʿa views that were very influential in the
1980s and the 1990s, continuing to the 2000s. He was one of the early polemicists who
criticized the Iranian Revolution and warned against the threat of Shīʿite domination of
the Middle East. He developed a set of anti-Shīʿa ideas that were ethnic, doctrinal, and
political. On the doctrinal level, he was influenced heavily by the Salafī Wahhābī antiShīʿa thoughts, which see Shīʿism as a deviant sect. Interestingly, Surūr contributed to
anti-Shīʿa thoughts by adding ethnic and political aspects to his polemics. He warned
from “Persian Majūsī rāfiḍī” enlargement into the Gulf, Iraq, and the Levant. The Syrian
Shaykh was particularly skeptical about the alliance between the Iran revolutionaries and
“ʿAlawī Syrian regime,” thereby articulating a political version of anti-Shīʿism.
Surūr positioned himself and his followers as free centrist Salafis and
distinguished himself from two types of Salafis who he called the “ḥizb al-Ghulāt”
(radicals) and the “ḥizb al-Wulāt” (loyalists). On one hand, Surūr rejected the violent
approach of the radicals in pursuing their goals, but he also condemned the loyalists who
called for total obedience for the rulers. The Gulf crisis and the first protests against the
Saudi government in the 1990s reignited the old discussion about the validity of Salafi
participation in politics. The debates between Surūr and what he called “ḥizb al-Wulāt,”
who adopted a quietist posture, sheds light on the ongoing discussion about the question
of political engagement among Salafis.
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Consistent with the traditional Sunni view that emphasizes stability and warns
from rebellion and internal strife, Surūr rejected khurūg (rebellion) against the oppressive
or unjust rulers to maintain unity and social order. At the same time, he believed it is
permissible to call publicly on the government to pursue reform and challenge the
political authority for not fulfilling the implementation or violation of the sharīʿa.
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[Sheikh Muḥammad Surūr, Sururism, and our relationship with it.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABoQggHxlXs.
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------. “Naḥwa Kiyān Jadīd (21) al-Ḥiwār Bayna Ahl al-Sunnah: al-Salafiyyia bayna alWulāt wa al-Ghulāt” [Toward new Entity (21) Dialogue between the People of
Sunnah: the Salafism between the Loyalist and the Extremists.] al-Sunnah 56,
(1996) [1416]: 82-97.
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Al-Dhayidi, Mishari “Muḥammad Surūr ghādara Sūrīyah Baʿd Nakbah alIkhwān...
Istaqra wa ʿallma fi Buraydah... Khalṭa Ḥarakiyya alIkhwān bi Thawriyya Quṭb bi
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Muḥammad, Islam. “Maḥāṭāt Al-surūriyya (1): Kāifa Shakal al-Ikhwān Bidayyat altayyar al-Saʿūdi.” [Stages of Suruism (1): How did the Ikhwān form the beginning of
the Saudi Trend.] Ida2at, November 27, 2016. https://www.ida2at.com/alsrorihplants-1-how-muslim-brotherhood-forms-the-begining-of-the-saudi-group/.
al-Musa, ʿAli Saʿd. “Ikhwān al-Dakhl: Ghiṭaʾ al-Taḥwila.” [Ikhwān the Interior: cover of
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Nāb, ʿAdullah. “Mushaḥnat bayna al-Jāmiyya wa al-Surūriyya fi al-Saʿūdiyya.” (Hassles
between Surūrīs and Jāmīs in Saudi Arabia.) Ilaf, May 20, 2005.
http://elaph.com/Web/Politics/2005/5/63497.htm?sectionarchive=Politics.
Pargeter, Alison. The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power. London: Saqi
Books, 2013.
126

Shepard, William E. “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya,” International Journal of
Middle East Studies 35, no. 4 (11, 2003): 521-545.
http://ezproxy.rowan.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/195593321
?accountid=1360.
Teitelbaum, Joshua. Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition. Washington,
DC: Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 2000.
al-ʿUmaym, ʿAlī. “Mashāyikhunā wa mashāyikh al- Ṣaḥwa Nadharat fi al-Islām al-Saʿūdi
al- ḥarakī.” (Our Sheikhs and Sheikhs of Ṣaḥwa: insights on the Saudi ḥarakī Islam.)
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Appendix A
I followed the transliteration system used in Journal of Islamic Studies issued by
the Oxford Center of Islamic Studies to spell the Arabic words.

128

